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 This study describes the development and validation of the Reactions to Emotions 
Questionnaire (REQ), a measure that assesses individuals’ evaluation of themselves when 
experiencing various core emotions.  A primary aim of the current study was to explore 
the predictive validity of the REQ; specifically, whether scores on the measure predict 
recovery time following a distressing event.  Participants engaged in a negative mood 
induction to induce a sense of disappointment or failure.  Emotional arousal was assessed 
with physiological measurements and self-report of mood.  Cognitive arousal was 
measured with a task that compared time to recognize words related to the negative mood 
induction with time to recognize neutral words.  It was hypothesized that individuals who 
have a relatively accepting stance towards their emotions (as measured by the REQ) will 
have a quicker return to baseline levels of emotional arousal and will be less cognitively 
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primed following the negative mood induction than individuals who have a more 
judgmental stance towards their emotions.    
 Analyses indicated that emotional evaluation was not a significant predictor of 
emotional or cognitive arousal following the negative mood induction.  The level of 
arousal between individuals with either accepting or judgmental emotional evaluations 
did not differ following the failure manipulation.   
 A separate hypothesis addressed the REQ’s construct validity by predicting that 
scores on the REQ subscales would be moderately correlated with scores on 
questionnaires assessing ideas related to emotional evaluation.  This hypothesis was 
supported, as the REQ was moderately correlated with measures of constructs such as 
self-esteem, acceptance of emotional experiences, and emotional expression.  It was 
negatively correlated with measures of guilt, rumination, and suppression of emotions. 
 A secondary focus of the study was the relationship between emotional 
evaluation, emotion expression, and attachment style.  Attachment theory is one 
conceptualization of the etiology of emotional evaluation and emotion expression style, 
and a proposed model depicting the relationship between these three constructs is 
described.  First-order correlations and a canonical correlation analysis were conducted 
between the attachment styles outlined by Bartholomew (1994), tendency to inhibit 
emotions, and the subscales of the REQ.  Results suggested that attachment theory is a 
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There is a need in the current literature for a valid, reliable measure that addresses 
subjective emotional reactions to specific emotional experiences.  While there are 
questionnaires that assess responses to emotions in an objective or a general sense, none 
investigate specifically the degree to which individuals evaluate themselves positively or 
negatively when they experience certain emotions.  In an attempt to fill this gap, the 
Reactions to Emotions Questionnaire (REQ) has been developed.  The REQ assesses how 
individuals feel about themselves when experiencing various core emotions.  Internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability and convergent and discriminant validity have been 
collected and will be presented, along with factor analysis results.  The purpose of the 
current study is to provide further validation information for the REQ.  A primary set of 
hypotheses will address the REQ’s predictive validity by investigating its ability to 
predict recovery from a distressing event.  In addition, a second set of hypotheses will 
address the REQ’s construct validity by examining the relationship between acceptance 
of emotions, emotion inhibition, and attachment style.   
There are many different ways to react to an emotion.  Some individuals tend to 
become upset, frustrated, or self-critical over an emotional experience, while others are 
inclined to be accepting of and open to their emotion.  Such individuals might simply 
experience the primary emotion without the additional layer of judgment.  Preliminary 
evidence suggests that the manner in which an individual evaluates his or her emotions 
has a bearing on the subsequent levels of psychological distress, with a more positive, 
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accepting evaluation leading to less distress (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Wells & 
Carter, 2001).  
There is a growing interest in reactions to emotions, especially regarding the role 
of emotional acceptance in mental health.  Emotional acceptance is an ingredient in 
clinical interventions such as dialectical behavior therapy (Linehan, 1987), acceptance 
and commitment therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), and mindfulness-based 
interventions (Kabat-Zinn, 1994; Kabat-Zinn et al, 1992; Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 
1995).   
 One potential conceptualization of how emotional evaluations influence health 
outcomes involves their relationship to emotional processing.  Negative emotional 
evaluations are thought to impede effective emotional processing, while positive 
evaluations are expected to produce smoother and more effective processing.  Viewing 
emotions through a negative or ambivalent lens could exacerbate individuals’ level of 
distress, creating a downward spiral of angst and not allowing people to have the 
emotional space necessary to “think through” and process their emotions.  For example, 
individuals with Generalized Anxiety Disorder often believe that worry is dangerous and 
uncontrollable, yet necessary as a coping mechanism (Wells & Carter, 2001).  
Presumably, their ambivalent ideas about worry play a role in the development of their 
anxiety disorder by increasing their distress and not giving them the mental freedom to 
explore and process their anxiety.  An accepting, non-judgmental emotional evaluation, 
on the other hand, might allow individuals to move through distress more efficiently 
because the blockages created by increased negative emotions may not occur.   
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 The current study evaluates the REQ’s predictive validity by assessing its ability 
to predict physiological, emotional, and cognitive responses to negative feedback.  
Participants will engage in a frustrating problem-solving task and will be given 
unfavorable feedback while their physiological arousal and self-reported mood is 
measured.  It is hypothesized that individuals with non-accepting attitudes towards their 
emotions will exhibit a slower return to emotional and physiological baseline following 
the negative mood induction and will ruminate more following the stressful experience.  
Furthermore, it is hypothesized that attachment style as conceptualized by the view of the 
self and other will predict emotion inhibition and emotional evaluation styles.   
The validation of the REQ can fill an important gap in emotion regulation 
research by facilitating the reliable and valid assessment of reactions to emotional 
experiences.  The current study is an important step in the validation of the REQ because 
it will examine the relationship between the REQ and several self-report and non-self-
report indices of emotional processes.  Physiological arousal and rumination (cognitive 
priming of distressing thoughts) will be measured directly as opposed to being assessed 
by self-report.  The current study will also investigate the duration of emotional arousal 
in response to a simulated failure experience.  The REQ would be valuable in clinical 
settings by identifying individuals who are prone to struggle with depression, anxiety, or 
other emotion-related disorders.  The questionnaire also has empirical importance by 
providing a way to investigate emotional acceptance in a more standardized and therefore 





Responses or reactions to emotional experiences have recently garnered interest in 
the empirical and clinical fields of psychology.  Thoughts or emotions might occur in 
response to an initial emotional experience, such as feeling depressed about feeling sad or 
anxious about feeling panicked.  As interest in emotional reactions grows, however, so 
does the need for a valid and reliable way to measure individuals’ emotional responses to 
emotional experiences.  The current study introduces the Reactions to Emotions 
Questionnaire (see Appendix A), which addresses how individuals feel about themselves 
when experiencing various core emotions, such as sadness, pride, and anger.  The effect 
of reactions to emotions has been a focus in discussions of mindfulness and self-
compassion and is incorporated into clinical interventions such as dialectical behavior 
therapy and acceptance and commitment therapy.  A tenet of many such clinical 
programs is that the nature of reactions to emotions can impact subsequent levels of 
distress.  In other words, the degree to which a reaction is accepting, neutral, or 
judgmental can influence the impact of the reaction.  For example, responding to 
depressive feelings with an attitude of “this is normal, it’s acceptable to have this reaction 
right now” might lead to less distress than an attitude of “I shouldn’t feel this way, most 
people don’t have feelings like this.”  What might lead individuals to react to the same 
emotion in such contrasting manners?  Investigating the etiology and function of 
emotional judgments has empirical and theoretical relevance to help clarify the role of 
emotional reactions in mental health.   
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In the following literature review the empirical roots of emotional evaluation will 
be discussed, including research on the impact of emotional judgment and the growth of 
constructs such as mindfulness and meta-emotions.  Clinical applications involving 
acceptance of emotions will also be described, followed by a discussion for the rationale 
of the development of the REQ.  The development of the questionnaire will be described 
as will the initial validity and reliability data and a factor analysis of previously collected 
scores.  The literature on attachment style as it relates to emotion regulation and 
evaluation will be presented, along with a theoretical relationship between attachment 
style, emotion inhibition, and emotional evaluation. 
Judgment of Emotions 
Reactions to emotions can often reflect a judgment or negative evaluation.  For 
example, an individual might experience sadness and accept that experience as common 
and natural.  On the other hand, sad feelings might cause a person to feel poorly about 
him or herself and think that something is “wrong” with him or her.  This view of sadness 
in either an accepting or a non-accepting manner might reflect an underlying belief about 
the “normalcy” or “appropriateness” of sadness, allowing the secondary emotion or 
thought to be in part a judgment of the initial emotional experience.  This pattern 
described for sadness might apply to any number of emotions, with reaction to the 
emotional experience including a judgment or evaluation of the emotion.   
Meta-Cognitions, Meta-Emotions, and Emotional Evaluation 
Several researchers have explored the idea of reactions to emotions empirically.  
Preliminary evidence suggests that the manner in which an individual views and 
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evaluates his or her emotions influences mental health outcomes.  Wells and Carter 
(1999, 2001) have used the term “type two emotions” to refer to feelings that arise in 
response to various emotions.  Their research focuses on the emotional experience of 
worry, and they define “type two worry,” or “meta-worry,” as the “negative appraisal of 
worrying itself.”  Examples of such appraisals might include “Worrying could lead to a 
mental breakdown” or “My worry might cause bodily damage.”  Study results suggest 
that type two worry as measured by the Anxious Thoughts Inventory (Wells, 1994), 
which assesses meta-worry, is linked with pathological or problematic worry as measured 
by the Penn-State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990), 
which assesses chronic and excessive worry (Wells & Carter, 1999).  Wells and Carter 
(2001) asked individuals with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) to complete a 
questionnaire assessing general tendency to worry as well as positive and negative meta-
cognitions about worry.  An example of a positive meta-cognition might be “worrying 
can help me cope with a threat,” while a negative meta-cognition might be “my worry 
can become uncontrollable.”  The results suggested that individuals with GAD are more 
likely than unafflicted individuals to report that worry is uncontrollable and dangerous.  
At the same time, these individuals also view worrying as a coping strategy.  Presumably, 
holding these ambivalent thoughts about worry can result in a self-conflicting cycle, 
where worry is both necessary and undesirable at the same time.   
Papageorgiou and Wells (1999) have also investigated metacognitions.  Their 
research suggests that positive and negative beliefs about rumination may be to 
depression what positive and negative beliefs about worry are to GAD, indicating that 
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metacognitions play a role in the development of both conditions (Papageorgiou & Wells, 
1999).  They researched GAD and depression through the use of thought diaries to 
evaluate private or personal emotional expression.  Over a two-week period, participants 
recorded depressive and anxious thoughts, and they also recorded answers to questions 
assessing various reactions to the thoughts such as meta-worry, or “worry about the 
thought,” controllability of the thought, believability of the thought, and dismissability of 
the thought.  An example of a question to assess thought believability is “How much did 
you believe the thought?”  Study results suggested that anxiety intensity was associated 
with meta-worry.  The more participants reported worrying about their anxious thoughts, 
the more intense their anxious thoughts tended to be.  These results are consistent with 
the idea that meta-cognition is involved in psychological disorder (Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 1999).   
Research on metacognitions also suggests that the judgment or evaluation of 
rumination plays a role in the development of depression.  Papageorgiou and Wells 
(2001) assert that individuals with recurrent major depressive disorder hold both positive 
and negative beliefs about rumination.  They addressed this notion in a study of beliefs 
about rumination held by individuals with major depression.  Beliefs about rumination 
were provided verbally to an examiner in response to probe questions such as “what are 
the disadvantages of ruminating?”  An example of a positive belief about rumination is 
“If I didn’t ruminate about my feelings, I wouldn’t be able to control them,” and a 
negative belief about rumination is “Only weak people ruminate.”  The authors suggest 
that positive beliefs about rumination are associated with the use of rumination as a 
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coping strategy to regulate mood.  On the other hand, negative beliefs about rumination 
are associated with a sense of hopelessness when ruminating (Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2001).  Therefore, if individuals with positive beliefs about rumination experience 
depressive feelings, rumination can serve as a coping mechanism to help stabilize their 
mood.  This same regulatory function might not occur in individuals with negative beliefs 
about rumination, as for those individuals rumination might instill a sense of 
hopelessness which could undermine rumination’s potential coping strategy 
(Papageourgiou & Wells, 2001).  Therefore, the degree to which depressed individuals 
appraise their rumination in either a positive or negative light can impact the course of 
their depression, supporting the notion that judgment or evaluation of emotions 
influences mental health.   
Rude, Little, and Neff (in press) highlight the role of emotional evaluation in 
rumination.  They developed a parallel version of Nolen-Hoeksema’s Ruminative 
Response Scale (RRS; 1991) which attempted to remove self-judgment from the wording 
of the items.  For example, Rude et al altered the original item “Think, ‘Why do I always 
react this way?’” to “Feel curious about my tendency to be upset like this.”  The authors 
assert that the revised item exhibits a less judgmental tone than the original.  The revised 
RRS items were less highly correlated with questionnaires assessing thought suppression 
and depression than were the original items. The authors interpreted this finding as 
suggesting there is a judgmental aspect to rumination which differentiates between 
harmful and beneficial modes of attending to emotion.  Presumably, an individual might 
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contemplate past events in either a self-critical or a benignly curious manner, reflecting 
an evaluative process that influences future levels of distress.   
Watkins (2003) investigated the role of evaluation of intrusive thoughts on 
tendency to ruminate and worry.  Participants completed questionnaires addressing 
tendency to worry and ruminate, as well as a questionnaire that asked them to rate 
appraisals and strategies used in response to intrusive thoughts.  Particular appraisals of 
intrusive thoughts were associated with increased tendency to worry and ruminate 
(Watkins, 2003).  For example, increased disapproval of intrusive thoughts and 
reprimanding oneself as well as the disapproval-dismissal factor of rumination were 
correlated with both worry and rumination, highlighting the role that evaluations play in 
predicting ruminative and worry behavior. 
Researchers discussing the role of a negative emotional reaction suggest it is 
linked with psychological distress, supporting the idea that the judgment of emotions 
plays a role in mental health outcomes.  Lynch, Robins, Mores, and Krause (2001) have 
used the term “secondary emotions” to refer to the emotions such as shame that can 
follow an emotional experience.  The authors assert that the presence of this negative 
secondary emotional experience may be an indicator that inhibiting the private 
experience of emotion is exacerbating distress as opposed to being useful.   
There has also been preliminary evidence suggesting that emotional evaluation 
has utility in predicting subsequent well-being.  Wells and Carter (1999) showed that type 
two worry was a stronger predictor of pathological worry (as measured by the Penn-State 
Worry Questionnaire, which assesses proneness to chronic, excessive, and general worry) 
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than type one worry, thoughts about the uncontrollability of worry, and anxiety level.  In 
addition, Nassif (1999) found that in a non-clinical sample, meta-cognitions regarding the 
negative aspects of worry, such as its uncontrollability and danger, predicted the 
development of GAD 12 to 15 weeks later.   
Clinical Applications of Emotional Acceptance 
 Dialectical behavior therapy. 
 The notion of emotional evaluation is becoming increasingly present in clinical 
applications with the effect of reactions to emotions being incorporated into symptom 
conceptualization and treatment.  For example, Linehan’s (1987) dialectical behavior 
therapy (DBT) discusses the idea of “radical acceptance.”  This practice is described as 
“focusing on the current moment, seeing reality as it is without ‘delusions,’ and accepting 
reality without judgment” (Robins, Schmidt, & Linehan, 2004).  Radical acceptance is a 
“total act” in that individuals do not choose parts of reality to accept or reject, but instead 
engage in a liberating stance of moment-by-moment acceptance (Robins, Schmidt, & 
Linehan, 2004).  This accepting approach is thought to decrease the tendency to cling to 
the unalterable past which allows for change, and can prevent becoming mired in an 
emotional experience (Robins, Schmidt, & Linehan, 2004).   
 Acceptance of emotional experiences is theorized to be a key component of 
change in DBT when used to treat borderline personality disorder (BPD).  A central tenet 
of DBT is that dysfunction in individuals with BPD is a result of high emotional 
vulnerability and difficulty regulating affect (McMain, Korman, & Dimett, 2001).  
Linehan (1993) asserts that emotional dysregulation in individuals with BPD is due to 
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biological irregularities coupled with an “invalidating environment,” with the latter 
construct being defined as an environment that trivializes, ignores, or dismisses the 
expression of a child’s internal experiences.  The result of this combination is individuals 
who learn that their interpretations of their experiences are wrong, who lack the ability to 
label, regulate, and tolerate emotions, and who look to the environment for cues on how 
to handle emotional stimuli (McMain, Korman, & Dimett, 2001).  DBT’s promotion of 
acceptance of emotional experiences provides the previously absent validation of 
emotional experiences.  This validation allows individuals with BPD to tolerate emotions 
and learn to correctly identify their emotions, which are important components of 
adaptive emotion regulation (McMain, Korman, & Dimett, 2001). 
 Preliminary evidence suggests that DBT is effective in treating individuals with 
BPD (Linehan, 2000; van den Bosch, Verheul, & Schippers, 2002; Westen, 2000).  DBT 
appears to help decrease emotional dysregulation, as measured by frequency of anger 
outbursts, and improve communication skills in individuals with BPD (McMain, 
Korman, & Dimeff, 2001).  The research also suggests that DBT is helpful for more 
specific BPD populations, such as individuals with BPD and a comorbid eating disorder 
(Palmer, Birchall, Damani, Gatward, McGrain, & Parker, 2003), hospitalized males 
reporting borderline traits who are struggling with anger and hostility (Evershed, 
Tennant, & Boomer, 2003), adolescents with BPD reporting suicidal ideation and 
psychiatric symptoms (Rathus & Miller, 2002), and women with BPD and comorbid drug 
dependence (Linehan, Schmidt, Dimeff, Craft, Kanter, & Comtois, 1999). 
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Acceptance and commitment therapy. 
 Similar to DBT, a core component of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT) is “a conscious posture of openness and acceptance toward psychological events, 
even if they are formally ‘negative,’ ‘irrational,’ or even ‘psychotic’” (Hayes, 2004).  
Hayes suggests that even though thoughts and beliefs develop in limited and perhaps 
misleading contexts, they can be granted a good deal of power or “truth.”  He asserts that 
openly and non-judgmentally observing a “negative thought” may thwart the maladaptive 
function that can arise when the thought is treated as “truth” (Hayes, 2004).  ACT claims 
that accepting all emotions will decrease the negative functions that can accompany 
suppressing or resisting an emotional experience.   
 Hayes (2004) theorizes that psychopathology is a result of “psychological 
inflexibility.”  He states that there exists a small set of “relational frameworks” that are 
utilized to make comparisons and to discuss events.  For example, an individual might 
think “If I do a certain action I will achieve a certain result, which will be good,” and this 
thought process may be adaptive in many circumstances.  This one “relational frame,” 
however, might not be applicable to all situations, and Hayes asserts that individuals 
experience psychological difficulties when attempting to apply too small a repertoire of 
relational frames to all experiences (2004).  He suggests that ACT produces 
“psychological flexibility” which can bring language processes (such as the “if ... then” 
example discussed above) into a contextual framework to decrease their problematic 
nature.  ACT utilizes interventions such as acceptance and “contacting the present 
moment” to develop increasingly larger flexibility in language application and use, 
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thereby decreasing the inflexibility that is thought to be linked to psychological distress 
(Hayes, 2004).    
 Empirical evidence involving ACT has suggested that incorporating an open and 
accepting stance to emotions and experiences is linked to mental well-being.  For 
example, hospitalized individuals with psychotic symptoms who received ACT as a part 
of their treatment were half as likely to be rehospitalized compared to individuals who 
did not receive ACT (Bach & Hayes, 2002).  Furthermore, the individuals who engaged 
in ACT reported a lower tendency to believe that their delusions or hallucinations 
reflected reality (Bach & Hayes, 2002).  ACT was also suggested to be useful in a non-
clinical population, as it was related to improved scores on measures of general mental 
health, depression, and propensity to motivate in a study addressing work-related stress 
(Bond & Bunce, 2000).   
 Mindfulness meditation. 
 Mindfulness meditation is another important clinical application with a focus on 
openness and acceptance.  Mindfulness meditation promotes a focus on the present 
moment with an accepting, non-judgmental attitude, without the emotional response we 
often experience as a reaction to our current reality (Kabat-Zinn, 1994).  Baer (2003) 
asserts that while in a state of mindfulness, thoughts, sensations, or emotions are to be 
noted with self-compassion, not judged as good or bad, but merely observed.  In fact, 
mindfulness is one aspect of self-compassion, a practice that emphasizes being open to all 
emotions instead of attempting to disconnect from or ignore our emotional experiences 
(Neff, 2003b).   
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 This emphasis on being open to experiences is thought to lead to beneficial 
restructuring of reality for individuals who are “stuck” in their current way of being 
(DelMonte, 1987).  Observing emotions through a detached, non-judgmental lens might 
help individuals see previously undisclosed patterns in their thought processes or 
behaviors that are hindering them in some way, as well as provide them the freedom to 
see more healthy or helpful alternatives.  Baer (2003) notes that a mindful stance can lead 
to improved self-observation, which can thereby increase one’s range of available coping 
skills.  Furthermore, mindfulness training may increase the ability to recognize problems 
at their outset, allowing individuals to apply learned coping skills at a time when they 
might be most effective (Baer, 2003).   
 Several researchers have applied the ideas of mindfulness meditation in a clinical 
setting, with promising results.  For example, application of a 10-week long stress 
reduction and relaxation program (SR&RP) which incorporates a mindful awareness has 
yielded significant group improvements in physical, emotional, and psychological 
symptomology, including physical pain, somatization, anxiety, depression, and self-
esteem (Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth, & Burney, 1985).  An aspect of the SR&RP found 
especially salient by the participants in this study is the idea that thoughts are just 
thoughts, and do not necessarily reflect truth or reality.  This idea alone was helpful in 
reducing anxiety and in being able to handle anxiety-provoking situations more 
effectively.  This outcome highlights the power of an aware, open approach to our 
experiences (Kabat-Zinn, et al, 1992).  Mindfulness training has been shown to decrease 
the salience of environmental triggers to prevent substance abuse relapse (Breslin, Zack, 
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& McMain, 2002), aid in learning new coping strategies, (Turk, Meichenbaum, & 
Berman, 1979), and alleviate depressive symptoms (Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Teasdale, 
Segal, & Williams, 1995; Teasdale et al., 2000).  With an open, non-judgmental focus on 
emotional experiences being a key factor of mindfulness meditation, these studies support 
the idea that emotional evaluation is a valuable and important construct with empirical 
and clinical relevance.   
 The literature on mindfulness suggests that a positive emotional evaluation is an 
important aspect of a mindful, open emotional awareness.  If an individual views his or 
her emotions unfavorably, it presumably would be difficult to be open, curious, or 
unassuming about emotional experiences.  Being emotionally open and curious 
necessarily incorporates a non-judgmental attitude, because if individuals view emotions 
in a negative light, they may much more readily become closed off towards and un-
accepting of their emotional experiences.   
 It is important to note that clinical applications such as dialectical behavior 
therapy, acceptance and commitment therapy, and mindfulness meditation do not 
promote emotional acceptance in isolation.  Each of these interventions incorporates 
emotional acceptance and openness in addition to other practices such as daily meditation 
or weekly skills training.  Therefore, researchers cannot be certain that being open to and 
accepting of emotional experiences is responsible for the promising empirical and 
anecdotal outcomes attributed to these interventions.  However, the fact that acceptance is 
a common factor among these and other beneficial approaches suggests that emotional 
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acceptance is an important clinical factor that warrants further research and hopefully 
further understanding and utility. 
Attachment Relationships as Possible Etiology of Response to Emotion 
 The research on mindfulness, secondary emotions, and metacognitions that serves 
as the backdrop for the development of the REQ suggests that emotional evaluation style 
impacts subsequent mental health, with an accepting stance towards one’s emotions being 
linked with positive outcomes.  This assertion, however, begs the question of what leads 
to the development of a given emotional evaluation style.  In other words, why do some 
people develop relatively accepting emotional reactions while others are more ambivalent 
or even judgmental towards their emotions?  A secondary focus of the current study is to 
address this question by investigating the intersection between attachment theory, 
emotional evaluation, and emotion inhibition. 
 Attachment theory is a potentially important influence on the development of 
either an accepting or a non-accepting emotional evaluation style.  Attachment style can 
be conceptualized as representing internalized views of both the self and others, and the 
current study introduces a theory that uses the self and other views to predict patterns of 
both emotional acceptance and emotional expressiveness.  Presumably, the messages 
learned about the self and others from early caregivers could impact how people interpret 
and react to their emotional experiences.  
Attachment theory addresses the quality of early caregiver relationships and how 
those relationships influence the development of the child (Bowlby, 1973).  According to 
Bowlby’s theory, the relationships with early caregivers are internalized by the child and 
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form the prototype for all relationships later in life.  The accessibility of the caregiver as 
well as the manner in which the caregiver responds to needs informs the child of his or 
her worthiness of being cared for and loved.  Bowlby described these internalizations as 
cognitive working models of attachment which refer to both the caregiver and the self 
(1973) and represent an attachment schema of the self and other.  Cognitive working 
models are internalized schemas about whether the caregiver is a person likely to respond 
in a supportive, protecting manner and also about whether the self is a person who is 
likely to elicit a helpful response from others, particularly the caregiver.  A child’s 
attachment experiences are thought to be the base for his or her adult attachment 
experiences.  An individual’s early experiences may lead him or her to seek out 
confirming attachment experiences as an adult in an effort to avoid the anxiety that arises 
with a novel or unexpected attachment experience.  Childhood attachment is not thought 
to remain unchanged into adulthood, however, but instead can change and develop over 
time.   
Since childhood attachment is thought to be the foundation of adult attachment, 
several adult attachment categories have been identified based on the characteristics of 
early caregiver relationships.  Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991) describe a four-
category model of attachment based on the cognitive working models of the self and 
other conceptualized by Bowlby (1973).  Previous researchers (Ainsworth, Blehar, 
Waters & Wall, 1978) identified the secure, anxious-ambivalent, and avoidant categories 
of adult attachment, but as researchers investigated these categories as they apply to adult 
relationships, the avoidant category was encompassing two patterns of behavior.  
 18
Bartholomew (1990) separated the avoidant category into two distinct categories to 
reflect the two differing behavior patterns, resulting in a total of four categories, titled 
secure, preoccupied, dismissing, and fearful.  It is important to note, however, that not all 
individuals fall cleanly into one category; often people reflect characteristics of more than 
one style (Bartholomew, 1990).   
The categories of attachment style are often conceptualized by the schemas each 
has of the self and others.  Each category views the self and other in either a positive or 
negative light which in turn influences the individual’s self-esteem and interpersonal 
functioning.  For example, a secure individual is described as having a positive view of 
self and other.  These individuals have a sense of worthiness or lovability as well as an 
expectation that others are supportive and responsive (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991).  
Dismissing individuals have a positive view of self and a negative view of others, 
resulting in an avoidance of close relationships and maintenance of autonomy and 
independence.  Preoccupied individuals have a negative view of self and a positive view 
of others.  This style leads to self-blame for perceived rejection by others, which allows 
preoccupied individuals to maintain their internalized self/other views.  A fearful style of 
attachment is described as holding a negative view of both self and other.  These 
individuals have a sense of unworthiness or unlovability and expect others to be rejecting 
and unresponsive.  As a result, close relationships are avoided as a way to protect against 
supposedly inevitable rejection.   
While cognitive working models begin to develop in childhood they continue to 
develop and shift in adolescence and beyond, influencing a variety of interpersonal 
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relationships.  Self-esteem and interpersonal functioning have been found to be related to 
attachment style into adulthood, with romantic partners and family members fulfilling the 
attachment figure role in adult relationships (Hazan & Shaver, 1987).  More specifically, 
Collins and Read (1990) found that in heterosexual relationships individuals selected 
partners with whom they had a relationship that reflected the attachment style held with 
the opposite-sex parent.  Bowlby (1973) asserts that individuals create social 
environments in ways that confirm their cognitive working models and create continuity 
of attachment patterns across the lifespan.  It is important to note, however, that adult 
attachment is not necessarily a fluid continuation of childhood attachment.  An individual 
might develop a certain attachment style as a child, but attachment experiences in 
adolescence and adulthood might challenge and alter the childhood attachment style.  
Childhood attachment provides the basis for adult attachment, but it is somewhat 
malleable as new experiences and interactions take place.  The adults in the described 
studies were presumably choosing partners who validated the cognitive working models 
they held at that time, which are influenced by but not necessarily the same as the 
cognitive working model held in childhood.    
Attachment does not, however, only influence adulthood in romantic 
relationships.  A person’s approach to his or her work reflects the traits present in the 
different attachment styles (Hazan & Shaver, 1990).  For example, secure individuals 
were found to be confident in their work, and avoidant individuals used their work to 
avoid social interaction, which reflects the desire of avoidant people to not engage with 
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others.  These results support the idea that attachment style affects various aspects of 
adult life. 
Cognitive working models are thought to greatly influence one’s social interaction 
(Bartholomew, 1990) which is related to the research on romantic relationships.  Adult 
emotion regulation is also affected by attachment style (Collins, 1996; Feeney, 1995; 
Fuendeling, 1998; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; Nelson, 2000).  For example, in an 
investigation on adult attachment, Feeney (1995) reported that securely attached 
individuals were not likely to control their negative emotions while avoidant participants 
tended to avoid acknowledging distress.  The four attachment styles also had different 
responses to anger situations.  Secure individuals tended to negotiate in anger situations, 
preoccupied individuals exerted indirect influence over the situation, dismissing 
individuals avoided the situation, and fearful individuals became aggressive (Feeney, 
1995).  Furthermore, Collins (1996) found that dismissing or fearful adults reported less 
distress than secure adults and were more likely to state they felt unemotional in an 
emotional situation.  Collins suggests her findings reflect the importance of incorporating 
both cognitive and emotional processes when investigating attachment style and 
emotional behavior, which highlights the influence of cognitions on emotional 
processing. 
Researchers have attempted to identify the various relationships between 
attachment style and emotion regulation.  For example, Bartholomew suggests that 
dismissing adults tend to isolate themselves from negative affective experiences, which 
serves to avoid the anger and anxiety expected to follow activation of the attachment 
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system.  In other words, a dismissing style is a protective mechanism against the negative 
emotions associated with attachment relationships (Bartholomew, 1990).  Feeney (1995) 
suggests preoccupied individuals crave closeness in their relationships, but do not see 
themselves as worthy of affection.  Therefore, it is not surprising these individuals 
responded to anger in ways that are non-confrontive and indirect.   
Research has supported the assertion that attachment style and emotion regulation 
are connected in some manner.  Given that attachment styles reflect either a positive or 
negative view of self and other, it is possible that these self and other views reflect deeper 
constructs or schemas that might give additional insight into how attachment style and 
emotion regulation are connected.  One intuitive association is between emotional 
evaluation and the view of self.  Perhaps the view of self in attachment style is related to 
a person’s emotional evaluation (i.e. how he or she judges an emotion).  With this 
conceptualization, a positive view of self could be linked to a positive evaluation of 
emotions.  In other words, a positive emotional evaluation might be a reflection of a 
positive view of the self in general, indicating a person who views the self as worthy of 
love and affection.  The converse also might be true, with a negative emotional 
evaluation being linked to a view of the self as unlovable and unworthy of affection.  The 
evaluation of the emotion may be a manifestation of a deeper sense of either self-
acceptance or self-criticism. 
Similar to the view of the self, the view of the other in attachment theory may be 
conceptualized as reflecting a deeper construct or schema.  Specifically, the view of 
others may manifest itself in one’s tendency to inhibit or suppress emotional expression.  
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Individuals who have a negative view of others might tend to inhibit their emotions 
because they might not think that another person is likely to be responsive or supportive.  
On the other hand, individuals with a positive view of others might feel comfortable 
expressing emotions since they may expect a supporting and caring response.  In each 
case, the way an individual expects others to react to an expression of emotions 
influences the tendency to be emotionally expressive, suggesting that the view of other 
plays a role in emotional expressivity.   
With these conceptualizations of self and other in mind, the four attachment styles 
can be described in terms of emotional evaluation and likelihood to inhibit emotions (see 
Appendix B).  The figure in Appendix B depicts theoretical relationships between 
attachment style, emotion inhibition, and emotional evaluation.  In order to investigate 
the manner in which these three constructs intersect, the current study measures 
individuals’ naturally occurring emotional evaluation, attachment style, and emotion 
inhibition to assess whether attachment style predicts emotional evaluation and emotion 
inhibition.  If attachment style is in fact correlated with these constructs in the manner 
hypothesized, the assertion that attachment style influences the development of emotional 
evaluation styles will be supported. 
 In addition to shedding light on attachment style as a possible influence on the 
development of emotion regulation styles, examining the proposed relationships between 
attachment style, emotion inhibition, and emotional evaluation serves to potentially 
further the REQ’s validity.  The questionnaires used to tap attachment style (the 
Relationship Scales Questionnaire; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994b) and emotion 
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inhibition (the suppression scale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; Gross & John, 
2003) have solid psychometric properties and are used widely in the literature (Griffin & 
Bartholomew, 1994b; Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004; Koole & Jostmann, 
2004; Sherry, Lyddon, & Henson, in press; Vuorela & Nummenmaa, 2004; Waskowic & 
Chartier, 2003).  Results that support the theorized relationships depicted in Appendix B 
would provide further construct validation for the REQ by suggesting that the 
questionnaire is a valid and adequate measure of emotional evaluation.   
Need for a Measure Addressing Emotional Evaluation 
 The current literature on secondary emotions, meta-cognitions, rumination, and 
mindfulness meditation suggests that the promotion of an aware, non-judgmental 
evaluation of emotions can lead to improved health outcomes.  As the literature and 
interest in this area grows, so does the need for a measure that taps emotional evaluation 
for use in clinical and empirical arenas.  While there are questionnaires available that 
address topics related to emotional evaluation, such as emotional clarity and ambivalence 
over emotional expression, they do not address emotional evaluation specific to a variety 
of emotions.   
 The REQ was developed to fill this gap.  The REQ assesses how individuals 
evaluate themselves along several dimensions when they experience various core 
emotions.  The purpose of this questionnaire is to assess emotional reactions to the self in 
the presence of specific emotions, not of emotions as a general category or the cognitive 
response to emotions.  This questionnaire would be useful in settings where emotional 
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evaluation is a part of therapy or assessment to help provide a more complete picture of 
individuals’ emotional processing patterns. 
As previously mentioned, there are questionnaires in the literature that address 
response to emotions but not in the same manner as the REQ.  Leahy (2002) developed a 
questionnaire that supports the idea that individuals tend to pass judgment on their 
emotional experiences.  Leahy’s Emotional Schema Scale (LESS) addresses emotional 
schemas, or “plans, concepts, and strategies employed in ‘response’ to an emotion.”  
Leahy contends that individuals’ schemas can either normalize or pathologize an 
emotion, leading to differences in duration and perceived controllability of an emotional 
experience.  Leahy states that emotional schemas reflect “what the individual believes are 
appropriate plans” following an emotional experience.  The notion that emotional 
schemas can either normalize or pathologize an emotion as well as involve beliefs about 
the appropriateness of actions in response to an emotion suggest schemas involve a 
judgment or evaluation on the part of the individual regarding his or her emotions.   
The LESS asks individuals to indicate the degree to which various statements are 
true of them.  Leahy (2002) proposes fourteen dimensions along which emotional 
schemas may be understood, including validation by others (e.g. “No one really cares 
about my feelings”); comprehensibility (e.g. “My feelings don’t make sense to me”); guilt 
(e.g. “Some feelings are wrong to have”); simplistic view of emotion (e.g. “I like being 
absolutely definite about the way I feel about myself”); higher values (e.g. “There are 
higher values that I aspire to”); control (e.g. “I worry that I won’t be able to control my 
feelings”); numbness (e.g. “Things that bother other people don’t bother me”); rational 
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(e.g. “You can’t rely on your feelings to tell you what is good for you”); duration (e.g. 
“Strong feelings only last a short period of time”); consensus (e.g. “Everyone has feelings 
like mine”); acceptance of feelings (e.g. “I try to get rid of an unpleasant feeling 
immediately”); rumination (e.g. “When I feel down, I sit  by myself and think a lot about 
how bad I feel”); expression (e.g. “I feel that I can express my feelings openly”); and 
blame (e.g. “If other people changed, I would feel a lot better”).   
The relationship between the LESS subscales, the Beck Depression Inventory, 
and the Beck Anxiety Inventory suggest that depression is associated with greater guilt 
over emotions, a belief that emotions are not comprehensible, a perceived lack of control, 
the idea that emotions would have a long duration, less consensus with the emotions of 
others, and greater rumination (Leahy, 2002).  Anxiety was related to guilt, rumination, 
less comprehensibility, less consensus with others’ emotions, belief in lack of control 
over emotions, and less acceptance (Leahy, 2002).  These results are supportive of the 
idea that one’s evaluation or judgment of emotions influences mental health, and Leahy 
(2002) suggests these data are consistent with Wells’ and Carter’s research (1999, 2001) 
on the effects of meta-cognitions on worry and anxiety. 
 There are key differences between the LESS and the REQ.  For example, the 
LESS addresses schemas individuals hold about their emotions as opposed to their 
emotional response to an emotion. Another difference is that the LESS addresses 
emotions as a general construct, while the REQ investigates the reaction to several 
specific emotions one at a time.  It is hoped that the REQ’s approach of asking 
individuals to place themselves in a specific emotional experience might paint a more 
 26
accurate picture of their emotional response than would be the case if individuals were 
asked to think about emotions in a general and therefore possibly detached sense.  
Furthermore, the REQ could potentially be interpreted item by item to gather information 
regarding specific emotional responding, such as how a person feels about feeling 
depressed or how a person feels about feeling proud.  This information might be useful in 
a therapeutic setting to give the clinician a very detailed look at emotional responding. 
 The Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) assesses 
tendencies to engage in various ruminative activities when depressed.  There are 
differences between the REQ and the RRS both in the nature and the scope of the 
constructs each questionnaire measures.  While rumination involves reflecting upon 
thoughts and events, the items on the RRS describe specific actions such as “Write down 
what you are thinking and analyze it” and “Think ‘why can’t I get going.’”  It is possible 
that there are individual differences in the manifestation of rumination that the specific 
nature of the RRS items fails to capture.  Conversely, the REQ items are more general, 
asking individuals to rate themselves along dimensions such as “unlovable/lovable.”  
What leads people to feel lovable might vary widely, and the non-specific nature of the 
REQ items can capture various manifestations of weak/strong, lovable/unlovable, and 
confused/clear-headed.  Also, the items on the RRS are specific to depression, precluding 
this questionnaire from being used to assess emotional response to a wide range of 
emotional experiences as the REQ attempts to do.   
 The Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & 
Palfai, 1995) instructs participants to “think about their emotions in general” and rate 
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their agreement to statements such as “I feel at ease about my emotions” and “Feelings 
give direction to life.”  It assesses the factors of clarity of emotions, attention to emotions, 
and repair of emotions.  The clarity of emotions factor is perhaps the most closely related 
to emotional evaluation, including items such as “I can’t make sense of my feelings” and 
“Sometimes I can’t tell what my feelings are.”  While emotional clarity could be 
considered one aspect of emotional evaluation, there are many more facets to judgment of 
emotions than being conflicted about identifying an emotional experience.  In fact, the 
REQ includes a subscale addressing how confused a person feels about his or her 
emotional experiences, but there are more aspects of emotional evaluation measured by 
the REQ than just clarity versus confusion.  Therefore, the REQ addresses emotional 
evaluation more fully than does the TMMS.  Another difference between the two 
measures is that the TMMS investigates reactions to emotions but does not engage the 
participant in reflection upon specific emotions, instead focusing on a general analysis of 
emotions.  Thus, while the subscales of the TMMS items are related to emotional 
evaluation, they are not synonymous with how a person feels about feeling various 
specific emotions.   
 The title of the Ambivalence Over Emotions Questionnaire (AEQ; King & 
Emmons, 1990) suggests it addresses the idea of conflict over emotion regulation style 
which potentially could tap emotional evaluation.  Its primary focus, however, is 
addressing ambivalence over emotional expression, not ambivalence over the emotional 
experience itself.  There is a flavor of evaluation in some of the items (e.g. “I try to avoid 
sulking even when I feel like it”), but the evaluation is manifested in whether a person 
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tends to express his or her emotional experiences to others.  The items on the REQ, on 
the other hand, tap a more private, personal evaluation of how a person feels about him or 
herself when experiencing various emotions, as opposed to a more public evaluation 
related to how others might react to the expression of the emotion.   
 The Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) 
measures beliefs about worry, intrusive thoughts, and meta-cognitive processes, but as 
the title suggests, the questionnaire is directed at the cognitive response to worry, not the 
emotional response.  For example, a sample item “Worrying helps me cope” taps a belief 
about worry and its role as a coping mechanism, not about the emotions that arise in 
response to worry.  The REQ attempts to assess the more immediate evaluation of self in 
response to an emotion that theoretically could occur before any cognitive thought takes 
place.  Furthermore, the MCQ does not address a wide range of emotional experiences, 
but is specific to the worry component of anxiety.    
Purpose of Questionnaire Validation 
 A key consideration in scale development is the measure’s validity, which refers 
to whether the questionnaire addresses the constructs or ideas it intends to address (Myers 
& Hansen, 1997).  A measure that purports to address a specific construct yet in fact 
addresses another is of little use to researchers or clinicians, making validity an important 
consideration when determining the utility and quality of a questionnaire.   There are 
several dimensions to validity that are often discussed.  Face validity is perhaps the most 
simple; it refers to whether the intention of a measure is self-evident (Myers & Hansen, 
1997).  Content validity refers to the “degree to which the content of a measure reflects 
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the content of what is measured” (Myers & Hansen 1997).  In other words, it addresses 
whether the questionnaire items are an accurate representation of the construct of interest.  
Construct validity assesses the degree to which questionnaire scores accurately measure a 
trait or theoretical construct (Ellis & Bluestein, 1991).  For example, a questionnaire that 
promotes itself as a measure of intelligence yet consists of items that tap self-esteem 
regarding academics would not have adequate construct validity as a measure of 
intelligence.  Methods of measuring construct validity may include investigating whether 
the questionnaire of interest follows expected patterns with other questionnaires (Myers 
& Hansen, 1997).  The questionnaire of interest may be expected to correlate with 
questionnaires that assess a related or similar idea (i.e. convergent validity) or to exhibit a 
low correlation with questionnaires that address unrelated or dissimilar ideas (i.e. 
discriminant validity).  Predictive validity refers to the degree to which scores on a 
measure yield information that predicts actual behavior or performance (Myers & 
Hansen, 1997).  For example, in the current study the ability of scores on the REQ to 
predict duration of emotional, cognitive, and physiological arousal will serve as a 
measure of predictive validity. 
 For years the prevailing methodology for determining validity was to address 
content, construct, and criterion-related validity (the latter term referring to predictive, 
convergent, and discriminant validity); this three-pronged approach was termed the 
“trinitarian view” (Anastasi, 1994; Ellis & Bluestein, 1991; Schilling, 2004).  However, 
this approach has been criticized because in practice researchers often incorporate the one 
of the three validation procedures thought to be best-suited for the anticipated purposes of 
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the test (Ellis & Bluestein, 1991).  Anastasi (1994) suggests that a negative outcome of 
the trinitarian view of validation is researchers’ viewing the different validation aspects 
as items to be “[ticked] off in a checklist fashion” regardless of the nature or purpose of 
the particular test.  Both of these criticisms suggest that the trinitarian view of validity 
diverges from the true purpose of validation by making validation a finite process that 
does not account for the theoretical underpinnings of a measure. 
 An alternative view to the trinitarian view of test validation is termed the 
“unitarian view,” which promotes the utilization of all three validity strategies during the 
process of test development as opposed to validation being a separate, last-stage process 
(Anastasi, 1986; Ellis & Bluestein, 1991).  To describe how the unitarian view might be 
reflected in test development, Anastasi (1986) suggests that the validation process begin 
with the formulation of construct definitions, often based on theory, research, or 
observation, which is followed by the development of test items to fit the construct 
definitions.  Empirical item analysis follows, resulting in a selection process of the most 
effective items.  This process is in turn followed by further analyses, such as factor 
analysis and validation and cross-validation of scores against external criteria (Anastasi, 
1986).    
 An example of a measure developed and validated as Anastasi suggests is the 
Emotional Expressivity Scale (EES; Kring, Smith, and Neale, 1994).  The authors first 
defined emotional expressivity, the construct they wished to measure, and then generated 
items to fit their definition (Kring, Smith, & Neale, 1994).  The authors note they were 
careful to produce a set of items that addressed emotional expressivity alone and not an 
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overlapping idea, thereby increasing the construct validity at the stage of item 
development.  The authors then gave the questionnaire to six separate samples of 
individuals.  Item analysis following the first administration ensured that overly difficult 
or easy items were not included in the final version of the EES; 17 of the original 40 
items met the desirable psychometric criteria outlined by the authors and were included 
in the final version (Kring, Smith, & Neale, 1994).  Later samples completed the finalized 
EES along with other questionnaires to address convergent and discriminant validity.  
Scores on the EES were also compared with naturally-occurring emotional expression 
and with parental ratings of general expressiveness, serving to validate the measure with 
external criteria, as suggested by Anastasi (1986).  Validation procedures following the 
same outline as Kring, Smith, and Neal’s work are found elsewhere in the literature, such 
as Neff’s validation of the Self-Compassion Scale (2003a).  
Initial Development of the REQ 
 The investigator recently developed the REQ to assess how individuals evaluate 
themselves along several dimensions when they experience various core emotions.  The 
current form of the REQ is a result of several stages of development with validation 
being considered throughout, as promoted by Ellis and Bluestein (1991) and Anastasi 
(1986) and modeled by Kring, Smith, and Neale (1994) and Neff (2003a).  An important 
initial decision was how to describe the emotions on the questionnaire.  While personal 
and clinical observation and theories such as mindfulness informed the investigator’s 
conceptualization of reactions to emotions, which is an approach to item construction 
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Anastasi (1986) suggests can increase the measure’s content and construct validity, it 
remained unclear how to best tap emotional evaluation on the REQ.   
 Similar to Kring, Smith, & Neale’s (1994) development of the EES, early 
versions of the REQ helped establish the items to be included in the final version of the 
measure.  To determine the most effective approach to describe emotional evaluation, 
various types of emotion descriptions were developed and then presented to pilot 
subjects.  A preliminary approach to the emotion descriptions was using vignettes to 
describe emotional situations, with participants rating their evaluation of various 
emotions in response to the described situations.  Two forms of the questionnaire 
featuring vignettes of varying length were developed.  The longer form provided 
descriptions four to five sentences in length, while the briefer descriptions consisted of 
two to three sentences.   
 Another potential method of describing the emotions was to provide a general 
description of each emotion and ask participants to think of a time in their lives when 
they experienced a similar feeling.  An example of the briefer, more general description is 
“People tend to feel sad when they have experienced loss or disappointment. Think of a 
recent situation in which you have felt sad.”   
 To help determine whether the long vignette, short vignette, or general description 
approach might be best, pilot subjects met with the investigator in small groups and 
viewed the three different versions of the items.  They were asked to think about which 
version provided the most personalized, subjective approach to each emotion.  Feedback 
from research participants suggested that the briefer, more general version was preferred, 
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with participants reporting being able to “get into” the emotional experience more 
effectively when instructed to think about a personal situation. 
 Along with emotion descriptions, it was also necessary to develop subscales upon 
which participants would be asked to assess themselves while experiencing various 
emotions.  Originally nine subscales or dimensions were included on the questionnaire, 
including bad/good, weak/strong, unlovable/lovable, defective/whole, out of 
control/stable, unworthy/worthy, incompetent/competent, abnormal or disturbed/normal 
or healthy, and confused/clear-headed.  Initial data collections, however, showed high 
redundancy among the nine subscales, indicating it would be more effective to decrease 
the number of dimensions.  Therefore, the subscales weak/strong, unlovable/lovable, and 
confused/clear-headed were included in the final version, both because scores on the 
subscales were not mutually exclusive and because they seemed to assess qualitatively 
distinct ideas.   
Initial Validation of the REQ 
 In accordance with Anastasi (1986), Kring, Smith, and Neale (1994), and Neff 
(2003a), the validation of the REQ involved a multistage process including a factor 
analysis and an investigation of its convergent and discriminant validity.  The REQ was 
administered to three separate samples (N = 172, 202, and 345; total N = 719).  For the 
factor analysis, all 719 REQ scores were analyzed together.   
Factor Analysis 
 To assess whether the items loaded on separate factors, a principle axis varimax 
rotation factor analysis was calculated.  The analysis yielded two factors, accounting for 
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28.50% and 15.28% of the variance.  Using a cut-off score of .4 for factor loadings, the 
three subscales of the sad, embarrassed, and anxious emotions loaded onto the first factor, 
titled unpleasant emotions.  The three subscales of the proud and excited emotions loaded 
onto the second factor, titled pleasant emotions.  The factor loadings are presented in 
Appendix C. 
 The “weak/strong” subscale of the item addressing anger yielded atypical results, 
as it did not load cleanly onto either factor.  The “unlovable/lovable” and 
“confused/clear-headed” subscales of the angry item loaded onto the unpleasant emotions 
factor, while the “weak/strong” subscale loaded relatively equally on both the pleasant 
and unpleasant emotions factor.  This result suggests that the weak/strong subscale is not 
as strongly associated with anger as it is with embarrassment, sadness, or anxiety/fear.  
Anger is different from these other emotions, however, in that it is often experienced 
along with a sense of power and energy, allowing participants to endorse feeling strong 
when experiencing anger more often than they endorsed this accepting evaluation option 
on the other unpleasant emotions.  Yet, the factor loading value of the weak/strong 
subscale for anger is higher for the unpleasant emotions factor than the pleasant emotions 
factor (.33 versus .23), and therefore the subscale will be included in the unpleasant 
emotions factor along with the other two anger subscales.   
 The two-factor outcome of the factor analysis suggests that the scoring of the 
REQ should result in two scales.  The sum of the subscales of the unpleasant emotions 
will be the Unpleasant Emotions Scale (UES), while the sum of the subscales of the 
pleasant emotions will be the Pleasant Emotions Scale (PES).   
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Convergent and Discriminant Validity of the Unpleasant Emotions Scale 
 Previous data collections have yielded adequate convergent validity of the REQ.  
Individuals with higher Unpleasant Emotions Scale scores (i.e. who, relative to others, 
reported feeling better about themselves when experiencing unpleasant or uncomfortable 
emotions) also had higher self-esteem, self-compassion, and emotional clarity, and also 
exhibited fewer tendencies to ruminate or inhibit expression of their emotions.  The UES 
was moderately correlated with the Self-Acceptance Scale (Rude & Pennebaker, 
unpublished) and with Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965).  The REQ 
Unpleasant Emotions scale was also moderately correlated with the Trait Meta-Mood 
Scale’s clarity factor (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995), which assesses 
how clear individuals are regarding their emotional experience, and the secure factor of 
the Relationship Scales Questionnaire (Griffin and Bartholomew, 1994b) which suggests 
these individuals reported a positive view of self and others.  The UES was also 
moderately negatively correlated with scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), which measures current depression, the 
Inventory to Diagnose Depression – Lifetime (Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987), which 
assesses previous depression, the Ruminative Responses Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), 
which measures tendency to ruminate over depressive feelings, and the White Bear 
Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), which measures tendency to inhibit 
emotional thoughts.  As expected, the scale was also negatively correlated with the 
neuroticism scale of the Big Five Inventory (McCrae & Costa, 1987).   
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The Unpleasant Emotions Scale also exhibited adequate discriminant validity by 
its low correlations with factors unrelated to emotional evaluation, such as the 
agreeableness scale of the Big Five Inventory.    
Convergent Validity of the Pleasant Emotions Scale 
 While the Pleasant Emotions Scale yielded promising validity results, its 
correlations are not as compelling as those for the Unpleasant Emotions Scale.  
Presumably, individuals generally feel relatively positively about themselves when 
experiencing pleasant or comfortable emotions, while there is more variation in their 
evaluation of unpleasant emotions.  This lower variability in scores on the PES results in 
lower predictive power and therefore lower correlations.  Also, there are only two 
pleasant emotions on the REQ, as opposed to four unpleasant emotions, another reason 
for the lower correlations.  However, scores on the Pleasant Emotions Scale (i.e. how 
positively a person feels about him or herself when feeling pleasant emotions) were 
moderately correlated with the extroversion scale of the Big Five Inventory, the secure 
scale of the Relationship Scales Questionnaire, and the Self-Acceptance scale.  They 
were also moderately correlated with self-esteem, the openness to new experiences scale 
and conscientiousness scales of the Big Five Inventory, and the emotional processing 
scale of the Stanton Emotional Approach Questionnaire (Stanton, Kirk, Cameron, & 
Danoff-Burg, 2000).   
 The correlations between scores on the two subscales of the REQ and other 
questionnaires are presented in Appendix D.  While the relationships between the PES 
and related measures are not as strong as those for the UES, it is important to note that 
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the PES yielded some significant relationships that the UES did not.   For example, the 
second administration resulted in a significant relationship between scores on the PES 
and the emotional expression factor of the Stanton Emotional Approach Scale, while the 
relationship between scores on the emotional expression factor and the UES were not 
significant.  A similar pattern was found with the openness and agreeableness scales of 
the Big Five Inventory from the second administration, with scores on these scales each 
having a significant relationship with scores on the PES but not the UES.  While scores 
on the PES may have less variability and therefore less predictive power than the UES, 
there is some degree of complementarity between the UES and the PES, with each being 
related to scores on related measures that the other is not.  Each scale, therefore, 
contributes distinct information about an individual’s emotional evaluation profile and is 
worth including in analyses. 
Reliability 
 The scores on the REQ from two separate administrations yielded promising test-
retest reliability values.  Reliability refers to the consistency of scores on a questionnaire, 
and test-retest reliability specifically addresses the consistency of an individual’s scores 
on the same measure at two or more points in time (Myers & Hansen, 1997).  Scores on 
the Unpleasant Emotions Scale from administrations one month apart were significantly 
correlated (r = .74; p < .01), and scores on the Pleasant Emotions Scale from those same 
administrations were also significantly correlated (r = .60; p < .01).  The UES and PES 
also exhibited adequate internal consistency, which is a measure of the homogeneity of 
items (Heppner, Kivlighan, & Wampold, 1999), or how well the set of items measure the 
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same underlying construct (Jensen, 2003), with Cronbach’s alpha = .86 and .79, 
respectively. 
Current Study – Primary Hypotheses 
 The concept behind the REQ is that an accepting, non-judgmental attitude 
towards emotional experiences allows people to process their emotions efficiently and 
effectively.  Ineffective or inefficient processing can lead to emotional dysregulation - 
getting “stuck” in a certain emotional experience or exhibiting an emotional outburst at 
an inopportune time.  The REQ attempts to assess the degree to which individuals tend to 
have an accepting/judgmental attitude towards their emotions, which presumably can 
help determine which individuals are prone to become mired in emotional distress and 
perhaps struggle with mood disorders such as depression and anxiety.  Individuals with 
high scores on the REQ report exhibiting a more positive emotional evaluation, and 
therefore these individuals are expected to come to terms more effectively with a 
distressing situation and to ruminate less following a distressing situation.   
 The proposed study will attempt to expand upon the previous validation research 
by investigating the REQ’s predictive validity.  This procedure follows the validation 
steps outlined by Anastasi (1986), with the final validation steps comparing scores on the 
measure with external criteria.  Specifically, the study will assess how well emotional 
evaluation predicts physiological, emotional, and cognitive outcomes.  The study will 
expose individuals to a mildly distressing situation and will examine the length of time 
before they return to an emotional and physiological baseline.  The study will also 
examine duration of rumination about the situation.  Furthermore, the study will attempt 
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to assess the construct validity data of the REQ by investigating its relationship to other 
questionnaires assessing constructs related to judgment of emotions.   The following 
primary hypotheses reflect the theory that REQ scores are related to how individuals 
successfully process emotions: 
 
Hypothesis #1:  Following a negative mood induction, individuals with less emotional 
acceptance will exhibit a slower return to emotional baseline as indicated by increased 
emotional arousal during the remainder of the study when compared to participants with 
more emotional acceptance.  Emotional arousal will be measured by monitoring skin 
conductance, heart rate, and skin temperature, and by self-report of mood.  The 
physiological and self-report measurements gathered prior to the mood induction will 
serve as the emotional baseline.   
 
Hypothesis #2: Participants with more emotional acceptance will ruminate less following 
the negative mood induction, with rumination being indicated by recognition response 
time to words related to the negative mood induction.  
 
Hypothesis #3: The REQ will be moderately correlated with questionnaires assessing 
ideas related to emotional evaluation, including the accept without judgment subscale of 
the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills, the Trait Meta-Mood Scale – clarity 
factor, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire – suppression and reappraisal factors, the 
comprehensibility, control, acceptance of emotions, guilt, rumination, and expression 
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subscales of the Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – trait version, and the Ruminative Responses Scale.   
Secondary Hypotheses 
Secondary analyses will explore the relationship between emotional evaluation as 
measured by the REQ, the four attachment styles as measured by the Relationship Scales 
Questionnaire, and inhibition as measured by the suppression subscale of the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire.  These analyses will serve to investigate the relationship 
between attachment style, emotional evaluation, and inhibition in an effort to more fully 
understand the potential influence of attachment style on the development of either an 
accepting or a non-accepting emotional evaluation style.  Using the proposed 
relationships between self/other views and emotional expression and evaluation outlined 
in Appendix B, the following secondary hypotheses are proposed:  
 
Hypothesis #1: Secure individuals have a positive view of self and others, so the more 
secure an individual is, the higher their emotional acceptance scores will be and the less 
they will tend to inhibit their emotions 
 
Hypothesis #2: Dismissing individuals have a positive view of self and a negative view of 
others, so the more dismissing an individual is, the higher their emotional acceptance 
scores will be and the more they will tend to inhibit their emotions.  
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Hypothesis #3: Preoccupied individuals have a negative view of self and a positive view 
of others, so the more preoccupied an individual is, the lower their emotional acceptance 
scores will be and the less they will tend to inhibit their emotions.   
 
Hypothesis #4: Fearful individuals have a negative view of self and other, so the more 
fearful an individual is, the lower their emotional acceptance scores will be and the more 




















Participants in the study were undergraduate students enrolled in an educational 
psychology course at the University of Texas at Austin during the spring 2006 semester.  
Data collection was in conjunction with the dissertation of another graduate student, 
Veronica Santos.  Her study involves two experimental groups and a control group, and 
the control group served as the participants for the current study.  Two hundred and five 
participants participated in the study with 84 participants in the control group.   
Measures 
 Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency coefficients were calculated for scores on 
each of the measures described below in the present sample.  They are presented in 
Appendix E.   
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; see Appendix F) 
 This 22-item paper-and-pencil measure asks participants to rate on a four-point 
Likert scale their tendency to engage in certain behaviors when feeling down, sad, or 
depressed.  Example items include “Think about how alone you feel” and “Write down 
what you are thinking and analyze it.”  Scores can range from 22 to 88.   Scores on the 
RRS have demonstrated adequate convergent validity, internal consistency, and test-
retest reliability (Conway, Csank, Holm & Blake, 2000; Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003).   
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Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003; see Appendix G)  
 This 10-item paper-and-pencil questionnaire consists of two factors: suppression 
and reappraisal.  On a seven-point Likert scale, participants rate their agreement of 
statements regarding either emotional suppression (e.g. “I control my emotions by not 
expressing them”) or reappraisal (e.g. “When I want to feel more positive emotion, I 
change the way I'm thinking about the situation”).  Scores can range from 10 to 70.  The 
ERQ has exhibited adequate internal consistency, and the two factors have been shown to 
be independent of each other (Gross and John, 2003).  Scores on the four-item 
suppression factor have demonstrated adequate internal consistency across four separate 
administrations, with alphas = .73, .68, .75, and .76.  Test-retest reliability for both the 
suppression and reappraisal factors from administrations three months apart was .69.  The 
suppression scale has demonstrated adequate convergent and discriminant validity data, 
such as being negatively correlated with scores on the venting subscale of the COPE 
(Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; r = -.43, p < .05), positively correlated with scores 
on Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s (1991) measure of rumination (r = .18, p < .05), and 
non-significantly correlated with the neuroticism scale of the Big Five Inventory (r = .03; 
p > .05; Gross & John, 2003).  The suppression factor served as a measure of emotion 
inhibition in the current study.   
Relationship Scales Questionnaire (RSQ; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994b; see Appendix 
H)  
This measure served as a measure of attachment style by assessing the degree to 
which individuals feel their interpersonal style corresponds to statements reflecting the 
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four attachment styles of secure, preoccupied, fearful, and dismissing.  The RSQ is a 30-
item paper-and-pencil instrument that draws from Hazan and Shaver's (1987) attachment 
measure, Bartholomew and Horowitz's (1991) Relationship Questionnaire, and Collins 
and Read's (1990) Adult Attachment Scale. On a five-point scale, participants rate the 
extent to which each statement best describes their characteristic style in close 
relationships and means are calculated for each of the four attachment dimensions.  
Scores on the secure and dismissing subscales can range from 5 to 25, and scores on the 
preoccupied and fearful subscales can range from 4 to 20.  The RSQ was designed as a 
continuous measure of adult attachment that provides an attachment profile for each 
participant rather than a categorical assignment, which reflects the idea that individuals 
might have traits in each style.  As described in the previous section on attachment and 
depicted in Appendix B, the four attachment styles can be conceptualized in terms of the 
view of the self as worthy and loveable along with the view of the other as supportive and 
responsive.  The RSQ assesses the degree to which an individual views both the self and 
the other in either a positive or a negative light to help determine the degree to which he 
or she reflects each of the four attachment styles.    
To help inform whether all four attachment styles assess unique patterns of 
self/other views, Waskowic and Chartier (2003) conducted first-order correlations among 
the four attachment styles as determined by the RSQ.  Any one attachment style being 
highly positively or negatively correlated with the other three styles might suggest that 
assessing all four styles is redundant.  They found that only three of the six correlations 
were significant (secure-dismissing, secure-fearful, and fearful-dismissing; all p’s < .01).  
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The authors suggest that these results indicate that divergent constructs are being 
measured by the RSQ.  Furthermore, fearful attachment as measured by the RSQ has 
been included in empirical investigations independent from the other three attachment 
styles (Dutton, Starzomski & Ryan, 1996), indicating the four attachment styles are 
independent constructs.  Thus, while there are relational patterns among the four 
attachment styles, each style is addressing a distinct idea and exploring individual 
differences on all four styles is worthwhile. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; see 
Appendix I)   
 The BDI was included in the present study as a screening device.  Participants 
with a BDI score of 20 or greater were excluded from the study to avoid exposing 
participants who are depressed or vulnerable to depression to a negative mood induction.   
 The BDI is a widely used scale of current depression. Participants are presented 
with 20 groups of four statements reflecting intensifying degrees of depressive factors 
(e.g. sadness, crying, decreased appetite) and are asked to choose the statement that best 
describes how they have felt for the previous two weeks.  Scores can range from 0 to 60.  
The measure has exhibited adequate test-retest reliability and adequate internal 
consistency (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988).   
Speilberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait form (STAI; Speilberger, Gorsuch, & 
Lushene, 1970; see Appendix J)  
Participants are asked to rate on a four-point Likert scale how often they 
experience twenty symptoms of anxiety, such as “I am a steady person.”  Scores can 
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range from 20 to 80.  The trait version assesses anxiety as a general trait, not an 
individual’s current level of anxiety.  Scores on the measure have yielded adequate 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Gaudry, Vagg, & Spielberger, 1975; 
Spielberger, Sydeman, Owen & Marsh, 1999).   
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; see 
Appendix K) 
 The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule served as a measure of mood 
throughout the study.  The scale consists of two 8-item scales, one assessing positive 
affect and one assessing negative affect.  On a five-point scale participants rate the extent 
to which they experienced a mood state in a specified time period.  Scores for each 
subscale can range from 8 to 40.  Both the Positive Affect and Negative Affect scales 
have demonstrated internal consistency, with Cronbach’s coefficient alphas ranging 
between .86 to .90 for the Positive Affect scale, and .84 to .87 for the Negative Affect 
scale.  The PANAS has exhibited adequate construct validity, with the Positive Affect 
scale negatively correlated and the Negative Affect scale positively correlated with the 
BDI (Beck et al., 1961).  The Negative Affect scale also significantly correlated with a 
measure of general distress (Watson et al., 1988).  
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; see 
Appendix L) 
 The Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills is a 36 item paper-and-pencil 
measure that assesses components of mindfulness in everyday life.  Factor analysis 
indicated four factors: observe, describe, act with awareness, and accept without 
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judgment.  The accept without judgment subscale, which consists of nine items focusing 
on the respondents’ tendency to be nonjudgmental about experience in the moment, is 
included in the present study.  Participants rate on a five-point Likert scale how true 
statements are for them.  An example item is “I tell myself that I shouldn’t be feeling the 
way I’m feeling.”  Scores on the accept without judgment scale can range from 9 to 45.  
Scores on the accept without judgment scale have yielded a coefficient alpha of .87, with 
a test-retest reliability value of .83.  Construct validity has included a negative correlation 
with the neuroticism scale of the Big Five Inventory (McCrae & Costa, 1987), the global 
severity index of the Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis, 1992), the difficulty 
identifying feelings and difficulty describing feelings scales of the Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1993), and the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson, Bissett, Batten, et al., 2004). 
Leahy Emotional Schema Scale – guilt, rumination, control, acceptance of emotions, 
comprehensibility, and expression subscales (LESS; Leahy, 2002; see Appendix M) 
 As previously described, the Leahy Emotional Schema Scale is a paper-and-
pencil measure that addresses schemas individuals hold about their emotions along 14 
different dimensions (Leahy, 2002).  In the current study, 6 of those 14 dimensions were 
included: guilt, rumination, control, acceptance of emotions, comprehensibility, and 
expression.  The number of items on each subscale differs, with two items on the 
expression subscale, four on the guilt subscale, five on the rumination subscale, three on 
the control subscale, seven on the acceptance of emotions subscale, and four on the 
comprehensibility subscale.  Therefore, the version of the LESS included in the current 
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study consisted of 25 items.  Participants were asked to rate on a six-point Likert scale 
how much they have used various statements to “deal with” their emotions in the past 
month.  The possible range of scores for the subscales included in the current study is 25-
150.  The comprehensibility, guilt, control, acceptance of feelings, and rumination 
subscales have all been shown to have adequate convergent validity (Leahy, 2002). 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965; see Appendix N)  
 The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale is a 10-item paper-and-pencil measure that 
addresses individuals’ self-esteem.  Participants are asked to rate on a four-point Likert 
scale their agreement to items such as “I feel that I have a number of good qualities” and 
“On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.”  Scores can range from 10 to 40.  The 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale has been shown to have adequate convergent validity 
(Butler & Gasson, 2006; Rosenberg, 1965) and reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha level 
of .92 (Johnson, McNair, Vojick, Congdon, Monacelli & Lamont, 2006).  
Trait Meta-Mood Scale – clarity factor (TMMS; (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & 
Palfai, 1995; see Appendix O) 
 The Trait Meta-Mood Scale is a paper-and-pencil measure that assesses the 
factors of clarity of emotions, attention to emotions, and repair of emotions.  In the 
current study only the clarity of emotions factor was included.  The 11-item clarity of 
emotions factor asks participants to rate on a five-point Likert scale their agreement to 
statements such as “I am usually very clear about my feelings.”  Scores can range from 
11 to 55.  Salovey et al (1995) found reliability scores for the TMMS to range from .82 to 
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.87, and Coffey, Berenbaum, and Kerns (2003) found the clarity factor to demonstrate 
adequate convergent and discriminant validity.   
Physiological Measurements 
 The three markers of physiological arousal were measured with a J&J 
Engineering I-330-C2 6+ channel system.  The physiological data were collected by 
wrapping electrode cuffs around the ring and index fingers of the participants’ non-
dominant hand.  The pads of the fingers were first wiped with an alcohol pad to remove 
excess oil and to prepare the hand for the electrode cuffs which were secured around the 
fingers with Velcro.  The hand was then strapped to a lap desk with Velcro strips to 
decrease extraneous movement of the sensors.   
 Heart rate. 
Heart rate served as one of the measures of emotional arousal.  Heart rate has 
been shown to increase during stress (Barger, Kircher & Croyle, 1997), and it was 
expected to be elevated during performance of the RAT task and following receipt of 
failure feedback.  The unit of measure for heart rate was beats per minute (Campbell, 
2004).  The degree to which heart rate remained elevated during the later stages of the 
session following failure feedback was interpreted as continuing experience of unpleasant 
emotion.  Heart rate is used extensively in the literature as an indicator of emotional 
arousal following inhibition of emotional expression (Gross & Levenson, 1993; Kraemer 
& Hastrup, 1988), degree of incentive/motivation (Tranel, 1983), behavioral activation 
(Fowles, 1980), level of arousal during a speech (Barger, Kircher, & Croyle, 1997), and 
level of arousal when discussing traumatic events (Pennebaker, Hughes, & O’Heeron, 
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1987).  However, heart rate has also been found to be susceptible to factors such as 
movement and deep breaths (Suckfüll, 2000), and the patterns in heart rate that indicate 
arousal are not always consistent because of peripheral resistance (Siddle & Turpin, 
1980).  The heart rate process has been described as biased, and measuring heart rate in 
conjunction with other measurements of arousal is beneficial to neutralize the variance 
observed in heart rate patterns caused by external factors (Suckfüll, 2000).   
 Skin conductance. 
Skin conductance served as one of the measures of emotional arousal.  Skin 
conductance has also been shown to increase during stress (Barger, Kircher & Croyle, 
1997; Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith & Kleck, 1976; Pennebaker & Chew, 1985).  The unit 
of measure for skin conductance was micromhos (uMho; Campbell, 2004).  A mho is 
equivalent to a siemens, which is the metric unit of electrical conductance (“Siemens,” 
2006).  Like heart rate, skin conductance was expected to be elevated during the RAT 
and following the negative mood induction.  The degree to which skin conductance 
remained elevated throughout the session served as an indicator of continued negative 
emotional experience.  Skin conductance has also been used widely in research involving 
emotional arousal, including as a measure of emotion inhibition (Buck, Miller & Caul, 
1974; Pennebaker & Chew, 1985), degree of incentive/motivation (Tranel, 1983), 
responsiveness to threat (Fowles, 1980), level of expressiveness (Lanzetta, Cartwright,-
Smith & Kleck, 1976), arousal during a speech (Barger, Kircher, & Croyle, 1997), 
arousal following emotion inhibition (Kramer & Hastrup, 1988), and level of behavioral 
activation when discussing traumatic events (Pennebaker, Hughes & O’Heeron, 1987).   
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Skin temperature. 
Skin temperature was a third measure of emotional arousal.  It is defined as “an 
index of blood flow changes from construction to dilation of blood vessels (Wofford, 
2001), and it has been found to decrease in stressful or threatening situations 
(Boudewyns, 1976; Rimm-Kaufman & Kagan, 1996; Svebak, Storfjell & Dalen, 1982).  
Therefore, skin temperature was expected to decrease during the RAT and negative 
feedback.  Skin temperature was measured in degrees Fahrenheit (Campbell, 2004).  The 
degree to which skin temperature remained lowered throughout the study served as an 
indicator of continued emotional arousal.  Skin temperature has been used in prior 
research as a measure of stress (Wofford, 2001), time pressure (Wofford, 2001), rest or 
relaxation (with rest being indicated by increases in skin temperature; McFarland, 1985); 
cognitive load (McFarland, 1985), anxiety level (Borden, Lowenbraun, Wolff & Jones, 
1993; Gerardi, Keane, Cahoon & Klauminzer, 1994), anger (Böddeker & Stemmler, 
2000), and responding of the autonomic nervous system (Min, Chung & Min, 2005).   
It is important to note that all physiological measurements are subject to 
extraneous variability caused by internal factors, such as positive affect states, mental 
exertion, and respiration (Freeman, Horner & Reichle, 1999).  Therefore, while 
physiological measurements are a widely used indicator of arousal, their susceptibility to 
uncontrolled external factors preclude them from being infallible gauges of emotional 




Mood Induction Procedure    
To induce a sense of failure, participants engaged in the failure version of the 
Remote Associations Task (RAT; Mednick, 1962).  The RAT involves asking 
participants to solve 10 problems, each of which involves finding a fourth word that is 
associated with three provided words (e.g. “box” is the correct answer to the provided 
words “soap-tissue-shoe”).  On average, 1 of the 10 problems is solved correctly (Brown 
& Dutton, 1995), and this procedure has been shown to successfully produce a sense of 
failure (Watkins, 2004).  In the current study, the number of problems was increased 
from 10 to 15 to increase the length of the task in an attempt to heighten the salience of 
the mood induction.  The additional five problems were deemed by McFarlin and 
Blascovich (1984) as being of the same difficulty level as the original 10 problems used 
by Mednick.  To further heighten the salience of the task, participants were told the RAT 
is a measure of problem solving ability and that most people answer between seven and 
nine of the fifteen problems correctly.  In accordance with McFarlin and Blascovich 
(1984), participants were given their actual score on the RAT since the difficulty of the 
task precluded the need for falsification of scores to induce a sense of failure.  
Participants were, however, given falsified feedback about the percentile rank that 
corresponded with their score. 
Rumination Assessment Task 
 The speed with which participants were able to recognize incomplete words 
related to failure as compared to unrelated words was used to infer continued priming of 
failure-related constructs.  Participants viewed words on a computer screen that had 
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several of the letters blocked out.  The words were either neutral (e.g. “automobile”) or 
related to failure (e.g. “disappointed”).  Participants were instructed to hit the space bar 
when they recognized the word and the computer recorded their response time based on 
when the space bar was hit.  They were also asked to say the word as they hit the space 
bar which allowed the researcher to note the participant’s word-recognition accuracy.  
There were 20 neutral and 20 failure-related words in the task, and word length was 
matched so there was an even number of long and short words in each category.  
Selection of the final word list was informed by results of a pilot study in which a small 
sample of individuals rated the difficulty of the words.  Words rated as either overly 
difficult or easy were not included in the final word list. 
Procedures 
 The study was separated into two phases.  In phase one, participants completed an 
online survey consisting of a battery of questionnaires and basic demographic 
information.  The questionnaire battery consisted of the Reactions to Emotions 
Questionnaire, Relationship Scales Questionnaire, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, 
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills – accept without judgment scale, Trait Meta-
Mood Scale – clarity factor, six subscales of the Less Emotional Schema Scale, the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory – trait version, and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.   
 Following completion of phase one, participants were instructed to sign up for 
and attend an in-person study session, which comprised phase two of the study.  Each 
session was conducted individually with each participant and lasted approximately an 
hour and a half.  In order to avoid demand characteristics, the researcher attempted to 
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create the impression that the two phases were unrelated projects.  An ID code unique to 
each person was used to match the data from the online survey and the study session. 
 Upon arrival to the session participants signed the consent form and completed 
the BDI.  Participants with a BDI score of 20 or greater were excused from the study and 
were debriefed at this point.  Participants then completed the PANAS to serve as a 
baseline measure of mood.  The PANAS was completed at several points during the 
session to assess mood changes over time.   
 Next, participants were connected to the physiological monitors by placing two 
electrode cuffs on the ring and index fingers of their non-dominant hand.  Participants 
then sat quietly for eight minutes to allow their heart rate, skin conductance, and skin 
temperature to stabilize and to allow baseline levels of these physiological measures to be 
recorded.    
 Following the baseline physiological period, participants engaged in the RAT 
(negative feedback) task.  This task involved participants’ completing 15 difficult word 
problems and being given false norming information to induce a sense of failure. 
 Participants then viewed a powerpoint presentation that discussed the biological 
response to emotions in a rather dry and academic way.  The powerpoint presentation 
served as a control for the two powerpoint presentations that were used for the other 
study that was based on these data (Veronica Santos’ dissertation). The other two 
powerpoints presented messages that emotions were either normal and benign and 
encouraged participants to accept them or that emotions should be carefully regulated and 
sometimes avoided. The control powerpoint seen by participants in the present dataset 
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was intended to raise thoughts of emotions without communicating evaluative attitudes 
about emotions or strategies regarding how they should be dealt with and was included 
because of the merging of Ms. Santos’ data collection with that of the current study.  Due 
to the neutrality of the presentation it was not thought to interfere with the emotional 
processing of the participants.   
 Upon completion of the powerpoint presentation participants completed the 
PANAS for a second time.  They then wrote continuously for eight minutes about 
whatever was going through their mind at the moment.   The writing instructions stated 
”Write about anything that you want to write about.  This can include lists, notes, or 
stream of consciousness.  There is no right or wrong topic to write about.”  Participants 
engaged in two of these writing periods during the course of the study, both to give 
participants time to emotionally process and to provide a time delay between the negative 
feedback and the later measurements of emotional arousal.   
 Following the first writing phase participants sat for three minutes to again allow 
time for emotional processing, after which they completed the PANAS for a third time. 
After the PANAS the second writing phase began, which lasted for 10 minutes.  
Participants were again asked to write about whatever was going through their mind at 
that time.  Participants then engaged in another three minute sit period and then 
completed the PANAS for a fourth time.   
 Next, participants participated in the word response task that was used to assess 
cognitive arousal in regard to the negative mood induction.  This task determined if 
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words related to the failure manipulation were still primed, which served as an indication 
of rumination over the negative mood induction.  
 Following the word response task participants were unconnected from the 
physiological monitors and were asked probe questions about their thoughts on the 
purpose of the study in an attempt to identify those participants who deduced the true 
nature of the study (see Appendix P).  At this point the participants were fully debriefed 
regarding the deceptive aspects and true purpose of the study, after which they were 
asked to sign a consent form indicating they understood the deceptive aspects of the study 
and were allowing their data to be used in future analyses.   



















 The study took place in two phases: an online battery of questionnaires and an in-
person study session.  Participants were informed that completion of both phases was 
required to receive experimental credit for the study.  However, many participants 
completed only the online phase, and some participants completed an alternate 
assignment in place of the study session because of scheduling difficulties.  Therefore, 
the overall participant pool was divided into three different samples: the participants who 
completed the online questionnaires (N=202), the participants who attended a study 
session following their completion of the online questionnaires (N=84), and the 
participants who were not able to be accommodated into the session schedule and instead 
completed an alternate assignment (N=21).  The derivation of the three samples from the 
general sample is described below, followed by a detailed description of each sample 
individually. 
Description of Sample Derivation  
 There were 205 total participants in the study.  Two hundred and two participants 
completed the online questionnaires, and 133 of these also attended the in-person study 
session.  Participants in the in-person study sessions were placed into three groups for the 
purposes of another study.  Only one of those groups (the control group for the purposes 
of the other study) was the focus of the present study.  Eighty-four participants were 
assigned to the group used for the present study.  Twenty-four of the 202 participants 
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who completed the online questionnaires could not be accommodated in the schedule for 
the study sessions and were given an alternate assignment in place of attending the 
session.  The alternate assignment included completing a subset of questionnaires from 
the online battery in paper-and-pencil format.  Three participants’ data from the alternate 
assignments were incomplete and therefore were not included in the analyses of test-
retest reliability for the REQ.  Forty-eight participants failed to sign up for a study session 
after completing the online questionnaires.  Therefore, the three samples consisted of the 
202 participants who completed the online questionnaires, the 84 participants who 
attended a study session following their completion of the online questionnaires, and the 
21 participants who were not able to be accommodated into the session schedule and 
instead completed a subset of the questionnaires a second time.    
Description of Online (Questionnaire) Sample 
 Two hundred and two participants completed the online battery of questionnaires.  
The sample consisted of 93 females and 109 males.  The age range was 18 to 35, with a 
mean age of 21.50 and a standard deviation of 1.99.  Race and ethnicity, while often 
combined into one question, were addressed separately.  The item assessing race was a 
multiple-choice item with response choices of Asian, Black, Latino/Hispanic, Native 
American, White, and Bi- or Multi-racial.  Ethnicity was addressed in two questions. 
First participants were asked in a yes/no question whether they identify with an ethnic 
group, and then those participants who indicated they do identify with an ethnic group 
were asked to provide the ethnic group they identify with in an open-ended question.  
Seventy point three percent of the participants described their race as “White” (n=142), 
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13.4% as “Asian” (n=27), 6.4% as “Black” (n=13), 5.0% as “Latino/Hispanic” (n=10), 
4.5% as “Bi- or Multi-racial” (n=9), and 0.5% as “Native American” (n=1).  The items 
addressing ethnicity were inadvertently omitted from the demographics section of the 
online questionnaire, but ethnicity data were collected from 130 participants during a 
study session.  Ethnicity data were not available for the 49 participants who did not attend 
a study session.  Twenty-three point eight percent of the 130 participants indicated they 
identify with a specific ethnic group.  Ten participants identified with an Asian ethnic 
group, seven with Latino/Hispanic, two with African-American, six with ethnic groups of 
Middle Eastern origin, one with the Jewish culture, and the remaining five identified with 
ethnicities from various countries in Europe and western Asia.   
Description of In-Person Session Sample 
 Eighty-four participants completed the in-person study session and all online 
questionnaires.  Data from12 participants were excluded because questioning of the 
participants following the study indicated these participants deduced the true nature 
behind the deceptive aspects of the study, and data from one participant were excluded 
because of difficulties with the physiological equipment.  The final sample consisted of 
71 participants, with 36 females and 35 males.  The ages of these participants ranged 
from 18 to 28, with a mean age of 21.24 and a standard deviation of 1.66.  Sixty-seven 
point six percent of the participants described their race as “White” (n=48), 16.9% as 
“Asian” (n=12), 7.0% as “Black” (n=5), 7.0% as “Bi- or Multi-racial” (n=5), and 1.4% as 
“Latino/Hispanic” (n=1).  Seventeen participants indicated they identify with an ethnic 
group, with six identifying with an Asian ethnic group, two with Mexican-American, one 
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with African-American, three with ethnic groups of Middle Eastern origin, and the 
remaining five identifying with ethnicities from various countries in Europe and western 
Asia 
Description of Alternative Session Sample 
 Twenty-one participants who could not be accommodated into the session 
schedule completed paper-and-pencil questionnaires and a demographic sheet as an 
alternate assignment to fulfill their course requirement.  Their completion of the REQ a 
second time allowed for an analysis of test-retest reliability.  This sample consisted of 16 
males and 5 females, with ages ranging from 18 to 34.  The mean age was 21.65 with a 
standard deviation of 3.22.  Seventy-one point four percent described their race as 
“White” (n=15), 14.3% described their race as “Asian” (n=3), 9.5% described their race 
as “Black” (n=2), and 4.8% described their race as “Latino/Hispanic” (n=1).  Twenty-
three point eight percent stated they identify with an ethnic group, with two participants 
indicating they identify with Korean-American, two with African-American, and one 
with Indian-American.    
 Analyses were conducted to ensure there were no differences between the sexes 
or between racial groups on any variable gathered in the online data collection or the 
study sessions.  The small N of the third sample precluded a comparison of groups for 
that sample.  There were no significant differences between men and women or between 
racial groups on any of the online variables or the physiological and self-report variables 
collected in the study sessions for the participants in the first two samples.  Therefore, the 
data from all participants were analyzed together.    
 61
Examination of Related Measures 
 The online survey included eight questionnaires yielding 17 subscales that 
assessed constructs deemed to be related to emotional evaluation.  These were emotional 
clarity (as measured by the Trait Meta-Mood Scale - clarity factor); self-esteem (as 
measured by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale); general acceptance of emotions (as 
measured by the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills – accept without judgment 
subscale); attachment style (as measured by the Relationship Scales Questionnaire); 
tendency to use cognitive reappraisal and to suppress emotional expression (as measured 
by the reappraisal and suppression subscales of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, 
respectively); emotional schemas (as measured by the expression, guilt, control, 
rumination, acceptance of feelings, and comprehensibility subscales of the Leahy 
Emotional Schema Scale), and trait anxiety (as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory – trait version).  A measure addressing tendency to ruminate (the Ruminative 
Responses Scale) was inadvertently omitted from the online questionnaire battery and 
was administered to 34 participants during the in-person study session.  The means and 
standard deviations of the subscales are depicted in Appendix R.   
Reliability   
  Reliability coefficients were calculated for each of the subscales.  Several of the 
scales demonstrated adequate reliability (see Appendix E).  Exceptions include the 
rumination and the expression subscales of the LESS, which yielded reliability 
coefficients of .51 and .31, respectively, and the secure, dismissing, and preoccupied 
subscales of the RSQ, which all yielded reliability coefficients of .41.  A possible 
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explanation for the low coefficients of the rumination and expression subscales is that 
they consist of few items (five items and two items, respectively).  
 The reliability for the RSQ was calculated by analyzing the items for each 
attachment style individually.  Also, the items for each of the four attachment styles were 
collapsed into two factors - avoidant and anxious - and the reliability was computed for 
each of these factors.  This addition was based on Griffin and Bartholomew’s (1994a) 
assertion that the items on the RSQ reflect “two dimensions of anxiety (or positivity of 
the self model) and avoidance (or positivity of the other model)” (p. 30).  Griffin and 
Bartholomew (1994a) promote gathering reliability information at the level of self and 
other views since while attachment is separated into four categories for theoretical 
reasons, those categories are based on how individuals differ along the view of self and 
other dimensions.  The authors note that the anxiety and avoidance dimensions should not 
replace the four attachment styles since the two dimensions alone provide an 
oversimplified picture of an individual’s relational patterns (Griffin & Bartholomew, 
1994a).  The two dimensions do, however, provide a useful conceptualization of 
attachment that can be used to analyze shared variance among the items on the RSQ in 
addition to an analysis of the attachment styles in isolation.   
 Twenty-one participants who could not be accommodated in the schedule for the 
in-session phase of the study (as described above) completed the REQ two months 
following the online administration.  Scores from the two administrations yielded test-
retest reliability coefficients of .78 for the UES and .62 for the PES.   
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Correlations among REQ and Related Measures   
 The current study allowed for a further analysis of the REQ’s construct validity 
by assessing how scores on the PES and UES related to scores on other questionnaires. 
Primary hypothesis three predicted that the REQ would be moderately correlated with 
questionnaires assessing ideas related to emotional evaluation, including the accept 
without judgment subscale of the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills; the Trait 
Meta-Mood Scale – clarity factor; the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire – suppression 
and reappraisal factors, the Leahy Emotional Schema Scale - expression, 
comprehensibility, control, acceptance of emotions, rumination, and guilt subscales; the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – trait version, and the 
Ruminative Responses Scale.   
 The results echo the data from previous unpublished data collections, with the 
PES and UES demonstrating predicted patterns in their relationship with other measures.  
The correlations from the two scales of the REQ and related questionnaires are presented 
in Appendix S. 
 The correlational data are generally consistent with predicted relationships.  As 
with the previously described data, the UES yielded more compelling correlations than 
the PES, which is again perhaps due to the fact that there is more variability in 
individuals’ evaluation of their unpleasant emotions than their pleasant emotions, and 
because there are 12 items on the UES as compared with 6 items on the PES.  Scores on 
the PES were significantly positively correlated with scores on the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Questionnaire, which measures an individual’s self-esteem, the Trait Meta-Mood 
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Scale - clarity factor, which measures how clear individuals are about their emotional 
experiences, and the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire - reappraisal scale, which 
assesses tendency to use cognitive reappraisal as a coping mechanism.  Scores on the 
PES were negatively correlated with scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory - trait 
version, which is a measure of general anxiety level, and the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire - suppression scale, which assesses tendency to suppress or inhibit 
emotional expression.  While there were significant correlations among scores on the 
PES and those on related questionnaires, the relationships were generally not strong and 
exploring the exclusion of the PES from the REQ might be appropriate.   
 Scores on the UES correlated in predicted patterns with scores on related 
questionnaires, and the data also are consistent with data from prior questionnaire 
administrations.  Scores on the UES were significantly positively correlated with scores 
on the Trait Meta-Mood Scale - clarity factor and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale.  UES 
scores were negatively correlated with scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory - trait 
version, and the Ruminative Responses Scale, which is a measure of tendency to 
ruminate.  Scores on the UES were positively correlated with scores on four scales on the 
LESS: expression, which measures likelihood of being emotionally expressive; control, 
which measures how much people feel they have control over their emotions; acceptance 
of feelings, which assesses how much an individual is accepting of his or her emotions; 
and comprehensibility, which measures degree of understanding about emotional 
experiences.  Scores on the UES were negatively related to scores on two LESS 
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subscales: guilt, which measures degree of guilty feelings stemming from emotions; and 
rumination, which measures tendency to ruminate over emotional experiences.   
Examination of Variables from Study Sessions 
 As described previously, a subset of individuals who completed the battery of 
online questionnaires attended an in-person study session.  In order to explore whether 
any self-selection factors were operating in terms of those students who completed the in-
person session and those who did not, all variables collected during the online session 
were examined for differences between these two groups.  Participants who attended a 
session differed significantly from those who did not attend a session on the Trait Meta-
Mood Scale – clarity factor [F(1,199) = 4.16, p = .04].  The mean score on the clarity 
factor for individuals who did not attend a session was 40.94 with a standard deviation of 
8.28, while the mean score for individuals who did attend a session was 38.64 with a 
standard deviation of 7.25.  Therefore, individuals who did not attend a study session 
reported being more clear about their emotional experiences than individuals who did 
attend a session.   
Analysis of Emotional Arousal 
 Physiological measurements. 
 To facilitate the analysis of the physiological data across time, the median heart 
rate, skin conductance, and skin temperature were calculated for each phase of the study 
session.  Medians as opposed to means were used because this measure of central 
tendency reflected variations in the data but were not as strongly affected by extremely 
high scores as were the means. 
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 Participants’ heart rate, skin conductance, and skin temperature were measured at 
30 second intervals throughout the course of the study session.  While the physiological 
responding during 14 distinct phases was collected for each participant, the interest of the 
study was only in particular phases that were related to the study hypotheses.  These were 
the baseline, RAT feedback (at which point the arousal was expected to peak), writing 1, 
sitting 1, writing 2, and sitting 2 phases.  Differences between individuals in reduction of 
arousal (towards baseline levels) were expected to emerge across the latter four phases.   
 Frequency analyses and scatter plots of each physiological measurement at each 
session phase were examined to check for evidence of nonlinearity of relationships and 
the presence of outliers. There was no evidence that the physiological measurements and 
REQ subscales were related in a curvilinear manner.  These analyses yielded the presence 
of an outlier for heart rate at the RAT feedback phase.  A median heart rate of 965.69 
created spuriously high group means for the RAT feedback phase, and therefore this heart 
rate measurement was omitted from further analyses.  The descriptive data for the 
medians of the three physiological variables at each of these six phases are presented in 
Appendix T.   
 In order to examine whether the manipulation functioned as intended, the 
measurements between the baseline and RAT feedback phases were compared for each of 
the three physiological variables.  Repeated measures analyses indicated that skin 
conductance levels at baseline and the RAT feedback phases were significantly different 
[F(1) = 95.36; p < .001].  Skin temperature levels at the baseline and RAT feedback 
phases were also significantly different [F(1) = 7.56; p = .008], but not in the expected 
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direction.  Skin temperature increased significantly between baseline and RAT feedback, 
while a decrease in skin temperature was expected.  Of note, however, is that while some 
studies suggest a decrease in skin temperature indicates increased arousal, other studies 
suggest that the direction of skin temperature variation is emotion-dependent (Levenson, 
Ekman & Friesen, 1990; Stemmler, 1989).  Specifically, anger and fear result in warming 
and cooling of the hands, respectively, suggesting that perhaps the mood induction led 
participants to feel relatively angry as opposed to fearful.  Heart rate measurements at the 
baseline and RAT feedback phases were not significantly different [F(1) = 1.14; p = .29].  
Therefore, the results involving skin conductance suggest that the negative mood 
induction did produce the expected increase in physiological arousal.  It is worth noting 
(see Appendix BB) that heart rate does appear to spike during the RAT feedback phase 
for some participants; but heart rate was extremely variable, within as well as across 
subjects, and this may account for the lack of statistical significance.  The correlations 
between the physiological measurements are presented in Appendix U. 
 It was expected that physiological measurements of the same type but measured at 
different points would be significantly correlated.  In other words, all heart rate 
measurements were expected to be correlated with one another, all skin conductance 
measurements were expected to be correlated with each other, and all skin temperature 
measurements were expected to be correlated with each other.  Skin conductance and 
skin temperature followed this pattern.  The skin conductance measurements at each 
phase were significantly correlated with one another, as were the skin temperature 
measurements.  Skin conductance in particular appears to be a relatively stable 
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measurement, as the correlations between skin conductance measurements at the various 
phases were at least .81.    
 Self-report of mood. 
 In addition to physiological monitoring, level of arousal was assessed by self-
report.  Participants completed the PANAS four times throughout the course of the 
session to allow for an evaluation of self-report mood across time.  The four PANAS 
administrations took place at baseline, following the powerpoint presentation (which in 
turn was after the negative mood induction), following the first sitting phase, and 
following the second sitting phase.  The PANAS results in two scales: the Positive Affect 
Scale (PA) and the Negative Affect Scale (NA).  Completing the PANAS four times 
during the session yielded eight PANAS scores: PA 1, NA 1, PA 2, NA 2, PA 3, NA 3, 
PA 4, and NA 4.  Coefficient alphas were calculated to address each subscale’s 
reliability, and the results are depicted in Appendix V.  The reliability analysis indicated 
that the PANAS scores were stable.  Descriptive data for the eight PANAS subscales are 
presented in Appendix W. 
 As with the physio data, a repeated measures analysis of the self-report measures 
of mood at baseline and after the RAT feedback served to examine whether the 
manipulation functioned as intended.  It was expected that during and shortly following 
the RAT and the RAT feedback phases, reported positive affect would decrease and 
reported negative affect would increase.  Positive affect decreased significantly between 
the first and second PANAS administrations [F(1) = 30.52; p < .001] while negative 
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affect increased significantly [F(1) = 13.02; p < .001].  Thus, the changes in positive and 
negative affect supported the effectiveness of the failure manipulation.    
 The correlations between scores on the positive affect scale and the negative 
affect scale of the PANAS are presented in Appendix X.  In addition, correlations were 
computed between scores from the four administrations of the PANAS and each of the 
physiological measures during each of the six session phases.  Results are presented in 
Appendix Y.  The majority of the correlations between physiological measurements and 
self-report measures of mood were not significant, as is often reported (Coventry & 
Hudson, 2001; Wofford, 2001).   
 Correlations of the REQ subscale scores with the physiological variables and 
PANAS subscales are presented in Appendix Z.  There was only one significant 
correlation, which was between scores on the negative affect subscale administered after 
the powerpoint presentation and scores on the UES.   
 Analysis of individuals grouped by REQ score. 
 The first primary hypothesis addressed the ability of the REQ subscale scores to 
predict recovery from a negative mood induction.  Specifically, individuals with a high 
(more accepting) REQ score were expected to exhibit a relatively fast return to baseline 
levels of physiological arousal and self-report mood.  In addition, the second primary 
hypothesis explored the REQ’s ability to predict level of cognitive arousal, proposing that 
individuals with a relatively accepting emotional evaluation would exhibit less 
rumination following a distressing event.  In order to facilitate the interpretation and 
graphic depiction of the data between groups, a between subjects factor was formed by 
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creating high, medium, and low groups on each of the REQ subscales.  Cut-scores were 
computed for both the PES and the UES to yield three, roughly equal-sized groups for 
each subscale.  The cut-scores were 25 and 27 for the PES, resulting in 26 participants in 
the low-PES group (i.e. those with a negative evaluation of themselves when 
experiencing pleasant emotions), 24 participants in the medium-PES group (i.e. those 
with a relatively moderate view of themselves when experiencing pleasant emotions), and 
19 in the high-PES group (i.e. those with a positive evaluation of themselves when 
experiencing pleasant emotions).  For the UES, the cut-scores were 29 and 34, yielding 
27 participants in the low-UES group (i.e. those with a negative evaluation of themselves 
when experiencing unpleasant emotions), 22 in the medium-UES group (i.e. those with a 
relatively moderate view of themselves when experiencing unpleasant emotions), and 20 
in the high-UES group (i.e. those with a positive evaluation of themselves when 
experiencing unpleasant emotions).  These between subjects factors were included in the 
analysis of the physiological and self-report data.   
 While the division of participants into three groups based on UES and PES score 
is somewhat less sensitive than treating UES and PES scores as continuous variables, this 
approach was preferred because it lends itself to easier interpretation.  Along with 
including REQ in a categorical fashion, however, all analyses were also computed using 
regression with REQ as a continuous variable.  All of the patterns in physiological 
arousal and self-report mood remained consistent regardless of whether REQ score was 
included in a categorical or a continuous manner.   
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 In order to assess physiological arousal across time, the general linear model was 
used to perform repeated measures analyses separately on each physiological 
measurement (heart rate, skin temperature, and skin conductance).  The repeated 
measures factor in each of these analyses consisted of the physiological measurement at 
the six key phases (baseline, RAT feedback, writing 1, sitting 1, writing 2, and sitting 2), 
and the between subjects factor was the group based on PES and UES scores described 
above.  So, in sum, each of these repeated measures analyses used either PES or UES 
group (high, medium, low) as a between subjects factor and time (baseline, RAT 
feedback, writing 1, sitting 1, writing 2, and sitting 2) as a within-subject factor.  
Dependent variables in each analysis were one of the three physiological measures. 
 In the following analyses the sphericity assumption was assessed using Mauchly’s 
test of sphericity.  The sphericity assumption was violated for all of the analyses of the 
physiological variables, and therefore the reported values have been adjusted using the 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment.    
 Finally, specific a priori contrasts were calculated for each physiological 
measurement to explore hypothesized interactions between group and time.  The 
difference between the baseline and sitting one phases for participants with high versus 
low UES and PES scores was explored in one a priori contrast.  In a second a priori 
contrast, the difference between the baseline and sitting two phases for participants with 
high versus low UES and PES scores was tested.   
 In the analysis of heart rate that used PES group as a factor, there was no 
significant main effect across time [F(3.21) = .62, p = .61] and no significant main effect 
 
 72
for PES group [F(2) = 1.52; p = .23].  In addition, there was no significant interaction 
between time and group [F(6.42) = .60, p = .75].   See Appendix AA.  The a priori tests 
indicated there was no significant difference in the change in heart rate of participants 
with high and low PES score between the baseline and first sitting phases (p = .22) or 
between the baseline and second sitting phases (p = .60).   
 Similarly, in the analysis of heart rate that used UES group as a factor, there was 
no significant main effect across time [F(3.34) = .62, p = .62] and no significant main 
effect for UES group [F(2) = .03, p = .97].  There was, however, a significant interaction 
between time and group [F(6.67) = 2.19; p = .04].  See Appendix BB.  This interaction 
appears to be primarily attributed to the fact that the heart rate of participants in the 
medium and low UES groups changed in opposite directions during the study session.  
The a priori tests indicated there was no significant difference in the change in heart rate 
of participants with high and low UES score between the baseline and first sitting phases 
(p = .87) or between the baseline and second sitting phases (p = .73).   
 In the analysis of skin temperature that used PES group as a factor, there was no 
significant main effect across time [F(2.19) = 1.73, p = .18] and no significant main 
effect for PES group [F(2) = .70, p = .50].  There was no interaction between time and 
group [F(4.38) = .63; p = .65].  See Appendix CC.  The a priori tests indicated there was 
no significant difference in the change in skin temperature of participants with high and 
low PES score between the baseline and first sitting phases (p = .27) or between the 
baseline and second sitting phases (p = .44).   
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 In the analysis of skin temperature that used UES group as a factor, there was also 
no significant main effect across time [F(2.21) = 1.50, p = .23] and no significant main 
effect for UES group [F(2) = .31; p = .74].  There was no significant interaction between 
group and time [F(4.41) = .38; p = .84].  See Appendix DD.  The a priori tests indicated 
there was no significant difference in the change in skin temperature of participants with 
high and low UES score between the baseline and first sitting phases (p = .72) or between 
the baseline and second sitting phases (p = .43).   
 In the analysis of skin conductance that used PES group as a factor, there was a 
significant main effect across time [F(1.38) = 54.13, p < .001].  See Appendix EE.  There 
was no significant main effect of PES group in this analysis [F(2) = .11; p = .90].   There 
was also no significant interaction between time and PES group [F(2.76) = .70, p = .55].  
The a priori tests indicated there was no significant difference in the change in skin 
conductance of participants with high and low PES score between the baseline and first 
sitting phases (p = .48) or between the baseline and second sitting phases (p = .74).   
 In the analysis of skin conductance that used UES group as a factor, there was 
also a significant main effect across time [F(1.37) = 54.91, p < .001].  See Appendix FF.  
There was no significant main effect of UES group in this analysis [F(2) = .95; p = .39].  
There was also no significant interaction between time and UES group [F(2.74) = .39, p 
= .75].  Furthermore, the a priori tests indicated there was no significant difference in the 
change in skin conductance of participants with high and low UES score between the 
baseline and first sitting phases (p = .72) or between the baseline and second sitting 
phases (p = .96).   
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 In addition to the physiological variables, the general linear model was used to 
perform repeated measures analyses separately on each self-report measure of mood.  
The repeated measures factor in each of these analyses consisted of the positive affect 
(PA) subscale and the negative affect (NA) subscale from the four administrations of the 
PANAS, which occurred at baseline, following the powerpoint presentation, following 
sitting 1, and following sitting 2.  The between subjects factors formed by creating high, 
medium, and low groups on each of the REQ subscales was used in the mood self-report 
analyses.  Thus, each of these repeated measures analyses used either PES or UES group 
(high, medium, low) as a between subjects factor and PANAS administration as a within-
subject factor.  Dependent variables in each analysis were either the PA subscale or the 
NA subscale of the PANAS.   
 As in the analyses of physiological variables, in the following analyses of self-
report mood the sphericity assumption was assessed using Mauchly’s test of sphericity.  
The sphericity assumption was violated for all of the analyses of the self-report variables, 
and therefore the reported values have been adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser 
adjustment.   
 In addition, a priori contrasts were calculated for self-reported positive affect and 
negative affect to explore hypothesized interactions between group and time.  The priori 
contrasts explored the difference between self-reported mood at PANAS administration 
one and PANAS administration three for participants with high versus low UES and PES 
scores.   
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 In the analysis of positive affect that used PES group as a factor, there was a 
significant main effect across time [F(1.95) = 64.42, p < .001].  See Appendix GG.  
There was no main effect of PES group in this analysis [F(2) = 1.60; p = .21].  In 
addition, there was no interaction between PES group and time [F (3.90) = .87, p = .48].  
A priori tests indicated there was no significant difference in the change in reported 
positive affect at the first and third PANAS administrations between individuals in the 
high and low PES groups (p = .16).   
 In the analysis of positive affect that used UES group as a factor, there was a 
significant main effect across time [F(1.96) = 62.29, p < .001].  See Appendix HH.  
There was no main effect of UES group [F(2) = 1.64; p = .20] and no significant 
interaction between group and time [F(3.93) = .43, p = .79].  In addition, a priori test 
indicated there was no significant difference in the change in reported positive affect at 
PANAS administrations one and three between participants with high and low UES score 
(p = .91).   
 Results for reported negative affect across time were similar to those for reported 
positive affect.  In the analyses of negative affect with PES as a factor, there was a main 
effect across time [F(2.37) = 7.83, p < .001].  See Appendix II.  There was no main effect 
for PES group in this analysis [F(2) = 1.28; p = .29] and there was no significant 
interaction between group and time [F(4.75) = .36, p = .87].  A priori tests indicated there 
was no significant difference in the change in reported negative affect at the first and 
third PANAS administrations between participants in the high and low PES groups (p = 
.76).  
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 There was a main affect across time in the analysis of negative affect with UES as 
a factor [F(2.34) = 7.32, p < .001].  See Appendix JJ.  There was no main effect for UES 
group [F(2) = .71; p = .49] and there was no significant interaction between group and 
time [F(4.68) = 1.03, p = .40].  Again, a priori test indicated there was no significant 
difference in the change in reported negative affect at PANAS administrations one and 
three between participants with high and low UES score (p = .23).    
Analysis of Cognitive Priming 
 In addition to emotional arousal, cognitive priming, or rumination, was assessed 
during the study session by measuring participants’ reaction time in recognizing words 
related to the RAT task and to failure, as compared to neutral control words. 
 The rumination assessment task consisted of 40 words appearing on a computer 
screen, with asterisks in place of some of the letters.  Participants were asked to hit a 
spacebar when they recognized a word that was either related to the RAT (negative mood 
induction task) or that was neutral.  In addition, they were asked to say the word as they 
hit the spacebar to ensure response accuracy, and the response word was recorded by the 
examiner.  There were 20 stimulus words in each category.   
 A “correct” response for a RAT-related stimulus word was any response word 
related to the negative mood induction task, while a “correct” response for a control 
stimulus word was the intended response word that was not related to the negative mood 
induction task.  At times, a participant’s verbal response to a RAT-related stimulus word 
was a variation of the stimulus word, and in those cases the response word was 
considered to be a correct response.  For example, the word “confusing” given in 
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response to the RAT-related stimulus word “confusion” was categorized as a correct 
response.  In a few instances, participants verbally responded to a control stimulus word 
with a word that was RAT-related.  For example, the stimulus word “digital” was 
considered to be neutral, but a response of “difficult” was deemed RAT-related.  Words 
such as the example response of “difficult” (RAT-related words given in response to a 
control stimulus word) were included in the analyses as being a correct RAT-related 
word.  The decision to categorize words as being RAT-related or neutral was made by 
independent agreement among two researchers with a third researcher serving as a tie-
breaker.  A list of initially incorrect words and their agreed-upon categorization is 
included in Appendix KK.   
 The mean and standard deviation for the median response times and for the 
number of correct response words for both RAT-related and control words are presented 
in Appendix LL.  There is a significant correlation between response time for RAT-
related and control words (r = .83, p < .01).  In addition, there is a significant correlation 
between number of correct words for both RAT-related and control stimulus words (r = 
.37; p < .01).  These results suggest participants’ speed and accuracy of responding to 
words was somewhat stable across both RAT-related and control words.  
 Cognitive priming across REQ groups. 
 In order to assess whether response time to neutral and RAT-related words was 
significantly different, the general linear model was used to perform repeated measures 
analyses on the two response task variables (median time to recognize RAT-related 
words and median time to recognize neutral words).  The repeated measures factor in 
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each of these analyses consisted of the two response time medians, and the between 
subjects factor was the group based on PES and UES scores used with the physiological 
and mood self-report data.  So, in sum, each of these repeated measures analyses used 
either PES or UES group (high, medium, low) as a between subjects factor and median 
response time to RAT-related and neutral words as a within-subject factor.  Dependent 
variables in each analysis were the two response time medians.   
 As in the analyses of physiological and self-report arousal, the analyses of 
cognitive priming were also computed using regression with scores on the REQ subscales 
as continuous variables.  All of the patterns in cognitive priming remained consistent 
regardless of whether REQ score was included in a categorical or continuous manner.   
 In addition, specific a priori contrasts were calculated for the word response task 
variables to explore hypothesized interactions between group and time.  The difference in 
median response times to neutral and RAT-related words for participants with high 
versus low UES and PES scores was explored in the a priori contrasts.   
  In the analysis of median response time with PES as a factor, there is a main 
effect of response time [F(1) =19.68; p < .001].  See Appendix MM.  Participants 
responded significantly more quickly to RAT-related words than they did neutral words. 
There is no main effect of PES group [F(2) = 1.44; p = .25], and there is no significant 
interaction between group and response time [F(2) = 1.81; p = .17].  A priori contrasts 
indicated that high and low PES individuals did not differ in the discrepancy between 
median response time to neutral and RAT-related words (p = .06). 
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 The analysis of median response time with UES as a factor indicates there is a 
main effect of response time [F(1) = 18.38; p < .001].  See Appendix NN.  Again, 
participants responded significantly quicker to RAT-related words than they did neutral 
words. There is no main effect of UES group [F(2) = 1.05; p = .36].  There is a 
significant interaction between UES group and response time [F(2) = 4.10; p = .02].  A 
priori contrasts indicated that high and low UES individuals did not differ in the 
discrepancy between median response time to neutral and RAT-related words (p = .81).   
However, low and medium UES individuals did differ in the discrepancy between 
median response time to neutral and RAT-related words (p = .02), as did medium and 
high UES individuals (p = .01).   
Analysis of Secondary Hypotheses   
 Secondary hypotheses explored the relationship between emotional evaluation, 
attachment style, and emotion inhibition in an effort to more fully understand the 
potential influence of attachment style on the development of either an accepting or a 
judgmental emotional evaluation style.  The four attachment styles can be conceptualized 
as a reflection of the tendency to view the self and others either positively or negatively.  
These self and other views were in turn proposed to be related to an individual’s tendency 
to have an accepting emotional evaluation and to be emotionally expressive.  
Specifically, the view of self was thought to manifest itself in emotional evaluation style, 
as individuals who are self-critical or negative towards themselves in general might tend 
to be more judgmental of their emotional experiences.  In addition, the view of other was 
thought to manifest itself in emotional expressivity, as individuals who view others as 
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responsive and supportive might be more likely to express their emotions as opposed to 
individuals who view others as unresponsive and unsupportive.  The proposed 
relationships between attachment style, emotional inhibition, and emotional evaluation 
are presented in Appendix B.  
While the secondary hypotheses serve to shed light on attachment style as a 
possible influence on the development of emotion regulation styles, they also serve to 
potentially further the REQ’s validity.  The questionnaires used to assess attachment style 
and emotion inhibition (the Relationship Scales Questionnaire and the suppression scale 
of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, respectively) have solid psychometric 
properties and are used widely in the literature (Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994b; Gross & 
John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004; Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Sherry, Lyddon, & Henson, 
in press; Vuorela & Nummenmaa, 2004; Waskowic & Chartier, 2003).  Results that 
support the proposed relationships depicted in Appendix B would provide further 
construct validation for the REQ by suggesting that the questionnaire is a valid and 
adequate measure of emotional evaluation.   
Canonical Correlation Analysis 
A canonical correlation analysis (CCA) was conducted to evaluate the 
multivariate shared relationship between the two variable sets (i.e. adult attachment and 
emotion regulation).  There are general advantages to including this method in an 
examination of relationships between constructs.  First, CCA is at heart a Pearson’s r 
correlation between a synthetic predictor and a synthetic criterion variable, which are 
created by applying a linear equation to the observed predictor variables and also to the 
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observed criterion variables (Sherry & Henson, 2005).  The current study includes four 
attachment variables as predictors and three emotion variables as dependent variables, 
and CCA is able to look at all of these variables together, both in terms of what variables 
are correlated as well as in terms of shared correlations among each of them.  
Furthermore, CCA only performs one statistical analysis between numerous variables, 
which decreases the probability of committing a Type I error.   
 In the CCA the four attachment variables from the RSQ were used as predictors 
of the three emotion regulation variables, which were the UES and PES subscales of the 
REQ and the suppression subscale of the ERQ.  The analysis yielded three functions with 
squared canonical correlations (Rc) of .34, .07, and .03 for each successive function.  
Collectively, the full model across all functions was statistically significant using the 
Wilks’ λ = .60 criterion, F (12, 508.28) = 8.98, p<.001.  Because Wilks’ λ represents the 
variance unexplained by the model, (1-λ) yields the full model effect size in an r2 metric.  
Thus, for the set of three canonical functions, the r2 type effect size was .40, which 
indicates that the full model can explain a substantial portion, about 40%, of the variance 
shared between the variable sets. 
 The dimension reduction analysis allows the researcher to test the hierarchical 
arrangement of functions for statistical significance.  As noted, the full model (functions 
1-3) was statistically significant.  Function 2-3 was also statistically significant, F(6, 326) 
= 3.21, p=.004.  The r2 type effect size, however, was .09, indicating that function 2-3 
only explained 9.3% of the variance between the variable sets.  Therefore, while function 
2-3 is statistically significant it is not clinically significant and was not included in further 
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analyses.  Function 3 (which is the only function that is tested in isolation) did not 
explain a statistically significant amount of shared variance between the variable sets, 
F(2, 194) = 2.60, p=.08, nor a clinically significant amount of shared variance, with an 
effect size of .03.  Thus, function 3 was not interpretable and was excluded from further 
analysis.  Therefore, given the Wilks’ λ significance values and the r2 effects for each 
function, only the first function is considered noteworthy in the context of the current 
study and was included in further analyses.   
 Appendix OO presents the standardized canonical function coefficients and 
structure coefficients for function 1.  Looking at the function 1 coefficients, we see that 
the UES and suppression subscale are relevant criterion and the PES is not.  The UES and 
suppression subscale accounted for significant percentages of the variance, 53.1% and 
59.6% respectively, while the PES did not account for a significant percent.  The UES 
and suppression subscale have opposite signs, indicating they are negatively related – as 
individuals feel more positively about themselves when experiencing unpleasant 
emotions they are less likely to inhibit expression of their emotions, which is theoretically 
consistent.   
 Regarding the predictor variable set in function 1, secure and fearful attachment 
variables are the primary contributors to the predictor synthetic variable, accounting for 
92% and 54.2% of the variance, respectively.  The dismissing and preoccupied 
attachment variables contributed to the predictor synthetic variable to a lesser degree than 
the secure and fearful attachment styles, accounting for 15.5% and 9.6% of the variance, 
respectively.  The secure attachment variable has a negative sign while the dismissing, 
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fearful, and preoccupied variables have positive signs.  This result suggests a secure 
attachment style is negatively related to the other three attachment styles, which is 
consistent with attachment theory and the aims of the RSQ scale.   
First-Order Correlations 
 To determine whether the theoretically based predictions of differential 
relationships of emotion evaluation (UES and PES), and emotion expression (suppression 
subscale of ERQ), with the attachment variables (secure, fearful, preoccupied, and 
dismissing) were supported, first-order correlations were computed.  The results are 
presented in Appendix PP.  The correlations among the four attachment variables 
indicated that in general each attachment style was negatively correlated with the three 
other attachment styles.  The relationship between fearful and dismissing, however, was 
an exception, with these two variables being significantly positively correlated.  This 
correlation corroborates the data from Waskowic and Chartier (2003) in which fearful 
and dismissing attachment styles were positively correlated. 
 The PES was not significantly correlated with any of the attachment variables.  
The UES, however, did yield statistically significant results with three of the four 
attachment styles.  Therefore, the UES but not the PES will be included in subsequent 
discussions of the correlations between scores on the REQ and the attachment variables.   
 The correlations shed light on the proposed relationships between the attachment, 
emotional evaluation, and emotion suppression variables as depicted in Appendix B.  
Each of the four attachment styles was thought to exhibit emotional evaluation and 
emotion expression patterns as suggested by their views of the self and other, which are 
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outlined based on the predominant attachment style.  Appendix QQ shows the model 
from Appendix B along with the correlations from the matrix in Appendix PP that 
correspond to each hypothesized relationship.  The correlations between attachment 
security, emotional inhibition, and emotion evaluation were as predicted and support the 
proposed model.  Similarly, the correlations between degree of fearful attachment, 
emotional inhibition, and emotion evaluation were as predicted and support the proposed 
model.   
 The correlations of the dismissing and preoccupied attachment variables with the 
emotion regulation variables were not exactly as predicted.  While attachment 
preoccupation was negatively related to emotional acceptance (UES) as expected, 
contrary to prediction, it was uncorrelated with suppression.  Similarly, attachment 
dismissing style was positively related to emotional inhibition as expected, but was 
unrelated to emotional acceptance.  While the pattern of correlation for preoccupied and 
dismissing attachment was not exactly as hypothesized, it is consistent with another 
reasonable conceptualization of the attachment styles.  This alternate conceptualization 
asserts that the majority of the variation among individuals with varying levels of 
dismissing and preoccupied attachment styles is accounted for by the degree of negativity 
these individuals have towards others and the self, respectively.  In other words, the level 
of dismissing attachment held by a dismissing individual is primarily determined by the 
degree of negativity towards others and not the degree of positivity towards the self.  
Therefore, an increase in dismissing attachment style would be associated with an 
increasingly negative view of others but not necessarily an increasingly positive view of 
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the self.  This framework would account for the significant correlation between 
dismissing attachment and emotional inhibition as well as the non-significant correlation 
between dismissing attachment and emotional evaluation.  This same principle could 
apply to preoccupied attachment style, with the level of attachment preoccupation being 
determined primarily by the degree of negativity towards the self and not by the degree of 
positivity towards others.  Thus, an increase in preoccupied attachment would be 
accompanied by an increasingly negative view of the self but not necessarily an 
increasingly positive view of others.  This conceptualization of attachment preoccupation 
accounts for the negative correlation between preoccupied attachment with emotional 
acceptance and the non-significant correlation of preoccupied attachment with emotional 
inhibition.  Therefore, it can be argued that the pattern of correlations is actually very 
supportive of the proposed model.    













 The primary aim of the present study was to assess the REQ’s ability to predict 
emotional and cognitive recovery following a distressing event.  Specifically, it was 
thought that participants with an accepting emotional evaluation as measured by the REQ 
would exhibit a quicker return to baseline as compared with participants who were more 
judgmental of their emotional experiences.   
 Following the completion of an online battery of questionnaires, participants 
attended a study session during which their heart rate, skin conductance, skin 
temperature, and self-reported mood (as measured by the PANAS) were assessed over 
time.  At the beginning of the study session, participants’ baseline level of arousal and 
mood were established.  Participants then engaged in a difficult word association task and 
were given false norms in an attempt to instill a sense of failure or disappointment.  They 
then viewed a neutral powerpoint presentation for the purposes of another study.  Two 
writing phases during which they wrote about their thoughts at that moment and two 
phases during which they sat quietly were intended to allow time for emotional 
processing so that individual differences in emotional processing could emerge.  Finally, 
participants completed a word response task that assessed whether words related to the 
negative mood induction were still cognitively primed.   
Summary and Discussion of Hypotheses 
 A major goal of the study was to explore the predictive ability of the REQ by 
assessing its utility in predicting levels of arousal, self-report mood, and degree of 
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cognitive priming following a distressing event.  In addition, the study aimed to examine 
the relationship between the REQ and related questionnaires.  Lastly, the study analyzed 
the relationship between emotional evaluation, emotion regulation, and attachment style.   
Primary Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis one. 
 Hypothesis one proposed that following a negative mood induction, individuals 
with less emotional acceptance would exhibit a slower return to baseline as indicated by 
increased emotional arousal during the remainder of the study when compared to 
individuals with more emotional acceptance.  Emotional arousal was measured by 
monitoring skin conductance, heart rate, and skin temperature, and by self-report of 
mood.  The hypothesis was not supported, as the results indicated that participants with 
accepting or judgmental emotional evaluations did not differ in their level of emotional 
arousal during the remainder of the session following the negative mood induction.  Also, 
regression analyses with the UES and PES scores as predictor variables and the 
physiological variables and the self-report subscales as criterion variables were not 
significant.   
 Hypothesis two. 
 Hypothesis two proposed that participants with more emotional acceptance would 
be less cognitively primed following the negative mood induction than participants with a 
more judgmental emotional evaluation, with cognitive priming being indicated by 
recognition response time to words related to the negative mood induction.  Results did 
not support this hypothesis.  Instead, participants with moderate UES scores performed as 
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high UES scorers had been expected to perform: these moderate-scoring participants 
exhibited relatively similar response times to RAT-related words and neutral words.  It is 
not clear what might account for this unexpected pattern.   
 Hypothesis three. 
 Hypothesis three stated that the REQ would be moderately correlated with 
questionnaires assessing ideas related to emotional evaluation, including the accept 
without judgment scale of the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills; the Trait Meta-
Mood Scale – clarity factor; Emotion Regulation Questionnaire – suppression and 
reappraisal factors; the expression, guilt, rumination, acceptance of emotions, 
comprehensibility, and control subscales of the Leahy Emotional Schema Scale; the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – trait version, and the 
Ruminative Responses Scale.   
 The results supported the hypothesis, suggesting that the REQ demonstrates good 
construct validity.  First, note that the UES and the PES related only moderately to the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale across two administrations, indicating that responses on the 
REQ were not merely a reflection of self-esteem in a general sense.  In addition, the UES 
was moderately correlated with the accept without judgment subscale of the Kentucky 
Inventory of Mindfulness Skills, which suggests that the UES and the accept without 
judgment subscale are measuring related but distinct ideas and are each a contribution to 
the literature.  This same trend is noted in the relationship between the UES and the 
acceptance of emotions subscale of the LESS – the moderate correlation indicates that the 
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two subscales are assessing similar constructs but are not tapping completely overlapping 
ideas.   
 The negative correlation between scores on the UES and scores on the 
Ruminative Responses Scale and the rumination subscale of the LESS suggest that as 
individuals have a more accepting evaluation of unpleasant emotions they tend to 
ruminate less.  This is theoretically consistent, as a positive evaluation is theorized to stop 
the downward spiral of negative affect that is associated with rumination.  In addition, the 
results suggest that as individuals are more accepting of their unpleasant emotions they 
are more likely to be emotionally expressive, to have a sense of control over their 
emotions, and to understand their emotions.  Also, having a positive evaluation of 
pleasant emotions is associated with the use of cognitive reappraisal as a coping 
mechanism.  Perhaps reappraisal is associated with a positive evaluation because 
individuals reframe their emotions in an optimistic, constructive manner. 
 Both the UES and the PES were positively correlated with the clarity factor of the 
Trait Meta-Mood Scale, suggesting that a positive evaluation of both pleasant and 
unpleasant emotions is accompanied by a sense of clarity over emotional experiences.   
 Of note is the fact that scores on the PES yielded only two significant correlations 
with scores on related measures that were not also found with scores on the UES, and 
these correlations were not strong.  Therefore, the utility of the PES is not as clear as the 




Discussion of results of primary hypotheses. 
 There are several potential reasons for the fact that the REQ was not a significant 
predictor of cognitive and emotional arousal after failure feedback.  First, it is possible 
that extraneous factors present during the writing and sitting phases influenced 
participants’ emotional and cognitive processing during these times.  For example, all 
participants were undergraduate students who were required to participate in the study for 
class credit.  Many students appeared to have a negative attitude about the study from the 
outset as they seemed irritated and annoyed that participating in a study was required.  
Many participants also appeared dismayed that the study session was to last the entire 
hour and a half, as often studies conclude before the allotted time and some participants 
come to expect an early release.  Also, the sessions were held in a room that is 
susceptible to outside noise, and frequently there was extraneous noise entering the room 
that could have been distracting to participants.  Presumably, if the sessions were held 
under different circumstances, in a sound-proof room with participants who held no 
negative opinions about the session before it began, individual differences in cognitive 
and emotional processing stemming from emotional evaluation style might have emerged 
which the REQ might have been able to predict.   
 Another factor that might have contributed to the non-significant prediction 
results was the length of time between the negative mood induction and the conclusion of 
the study session.  In the current study roughly an hour passed between the RAT 
feedback phase and the last physiological and self-report measurement.  It is possible that 
if participants’ physiological arousal and self-report mood were collected for a longer 
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period of time, individual differences in cognitive and emotional processing and arousal 
would emerge.  The session length was determined in an effort to balance the need for 
emotional processing time with the recognition that participants were likely to become 
frustrated and bored during a very lengthy session, which could in turn negatively impact 
the study results.  If the emotional processing time in the session could have been 
extended while at the same time not increasing participants’ irritation levels, perhaps 
differences in emotional and cognitive processing and arousal might have emerged that 
the REQ could have predicted.   
 Another potentially negative factor in the current study is the fact that the 
investigator was attempting to induce a state of emotional distress that was substantial 
enough to trigger varying reactions yet was not unethical.  It is possible that the negative 
mood induction was not “strong” enough to produce a judgmental response in those 
participants prone to be unaccepting of their emotional experiences.  Perhaps variations 
in emotional evaluation would have emerged had participants been told that their RAT 
score was an indication of a more personally significant construct than problem-solving 
ability, such as IQ, but ethical concerns precluded that from being a viable option for the 
present study. 
 In addition, the mood induction may not have led to the type of emotional 
experience that people tend to judge or evaluate.  The reported negative affect and skin 
conductance patterns suggest that the RAT was associated with an increase in negative 
affect and arousal, but that does not necessarily mean that participants were judgmental 
of the emotion associated with the negative affect and arousal.  For instance, the 
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increased skin conductance and negative affect could have been a result of frustration, not 
disappointment or failure.  Individuals might not be as prone to judge frustration as they 
would failure, which in turn means that REQ scores would not predict differences in 
arousal resulting from frustration.  Moreover, if the increase in arousal and negative 
mood was related to a sense of failure, perhaps the fact that the failure occurred in an 
unnatural environment decreased the salience of the failure experience, allowing 
participants to experience different levels of emotional arousal than they would in their 
daily lives.     
Secondary Hypotheses 
 The secondary hypotheses address the relationship between attachment style as 
measured by the RSQ, emotional evaluation style as measured by the REQ, and tendency 
to inhibit emotional expression as measured by the suppression subscale of the ERQ.  A 
model was proposed that suggests that the self and other views as indicated by attachment 
style are associated with emotional evaluation and emotional inhibition.  Presumably, 
individuals with a positive view of the self would have an accepting or positive stance 
towards their own emotions.  However, a positive view of self might not lead inevitably 
to expression of emotions.  Expression of emotions might be predicted better by the 
individual’s view of others.  If others are viewed as untrustworthy, for example, the 
individual might tend to curtail expression of their emotions (even if they held a positive 
view of these emotions).  Thus, acceptance of one’s emotions might be a reflection of a 
positive view towards the self in a general sense while emotional expressivity might be 
best explained as a reflection of the view of others as supportive and responsive.  The 
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purpose of examining this model is twofold.  It assesses attachment theory as an 
influence on the development of emotional evaluation style, as well as further validates 
the REQ as a measure of emotional evaluation if the proposed model is supported.   
 Hypothesis one. 
 Hypothesis one stated that since secure individuals have a positive view of self 
and others, a secure attachment style would be associated with an accepting emotional 
evaluation and a tendency to be emotionally expressive.  The results support this 
hypothesis, with the first-order correlations suggesting that the secure attachment variable 
was positively correlated with the UES and negatively correlated with the suppression 
subscale of the ERQ. 
 Hypothesis two. 
 Hypothesis two stated that since dismissing individuals have a positive view of 
self and a negative view of others, a dismissing attachment style would be associated 
with an accepting emotional evaluation and a tendency to inhibit emotions.  The results 
supported the theorized relationship between dismissing attachment and emotion 
inhibition.  There was not, however, a significant relationship between the dismissing 
attachment variable and the UES.  As individuals have a stronger dismissing attachment 
they do not tend to have a positive emotional evaluation, as was expected, but they also 
do not tend to have a judgmental emotional evaluation.   
 Hypothesis three. 
 Hypothesis three stated that since preoccupied individuals have a negative view of 
self and a positive view of others, a preoccupied attachment style would be associated 
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with a judgmental emotional evaluation and a tendency to be emotionally expressive.  
The results suggested that as individuals have a stronger preoccupied attachment they are 
more likely to be judgmental towards their emotions, which supports the proposed model.  
The results suggested that preoccupied attachment is not associated with a tendency to 
express or inhibit emotions.   
 Hypothesis four.  
 Hypothesis four stated that since fearful individuals have a negative view of self 
and others, a fearful attachment style would be associated with a judgmental emotional 
evaluation and a tendency to inhibit emotional expression.  The results supported these 
patterns, with the first-order correlations suggesting the fearful attachment variable was 
positively correlated with the suppression subscale of the ERQ but was negatively 
correlated with the UES.   
 Discussion of results of secondary hypotheses. 
 It was hypothesized that an increase in dismissing attachment style would be 
accompanied by an increase in emotional acceptance and an increase in preoccupied 
attachment style would be accompanied by an increase in emotional expressivity.  While 
these results were not supported, further reflection on the nature of the positive view of 
the self and others held by individuals with predominantly dismissing and preoccupied 
individuals, respectively, suggests that perhaps the view of the self and other do not 
inherently become more positive as dismissing and preoccupied attachment style 
increases.  In other words, as dismissing style increases, individuals may become more 
negative in their view of others but not more positive in their view of the self.  As 
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preoccupied style increases, individuals may become more negative in their view of the 
self but not more positive in their view of others.  With this conceptualization of 
preoccupied and dismissing attachment styles in mind, the significant as well as the non-
significant results yielded by the first-order correlations support the proposed model 
between attachment style, emotion inhibition, and emotional evaluation.  This outcome 
suggests that attachment style may be a useful conceptualization of the etiology of 
emotional evaluation and emotion inhibition.  This finding has both empirical and clinical 
implications, as it suggests the REQ is an adequate measure of emotional evaluation as 
well as sheds light on what leads individuals to develop various emotion regulation 
styles.   
Discussion of Correlations Involving Physiological Arousal 
 It was expected that an increase in self-report arousal would be accompanied by 
an increase in physiological arousal throughout the study session.  In addition, it was 
expected that the three physiological measurements (skin temperature, skin conductance, 
and heart rate) would show similar patterns of arousal across the session phases.  These 
expectations were informed by past research in which the three physiological 
measurements used in the present study served as indicators of stress (Barger, Kircher & 
Croyle, 1997; Boudewyns, 1976; Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith & Kleck, 1976; Pennebaker 
& Chew, 1985; Rimm-Kaufman & Kagan, 1996; Svebak, Storfjell & Dalen, 1982).  
These predictions were not supported.  In general, the physiological measurements were 
not significantly correlated with self-report measures of mood and there were few 
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significant correlations between the three types of physiological measurements across the 
session phases.   
 Other researchers have found similar results, with self-report data being 
uncorrelated with physiological measurements (Coventry & Hudson, 2001; Wofford, 
2001) or with physiological measurements themselves being uncorrelated (Matthews, 
Jones & Chamberlain, 1990; Wofford, 2001).  Perhaps this lack of corroboration within 
the physiological and self-report data is at least in part a result of physiological 
measurements’ susceptibility to being influenced by uncontrolled, external factors, which 
can introduce extraneous variability into the data (Freeman, Horner & Reichle, 1999).  
Furthermore, arousal as a general construct may not be consistently assessed by all 
physiological measures, as, for example, the variation of skin conductance has been 
found to be emotion-dependent and therefore changes depending on the type of emotional 
arousal a person experiences (Levenson, Ekman & Friesen, 1990; Stemmler, 1989).   
 The fact that non-significant relationships and inconsistent patterns involving 
physiological measurements have been reported in past research suggests that perhaps 
physiological measurements are very sensitive markers of arousal.  While significant 
prediction of physiological arousal by UES and PES scores would have been compelling 
validation evidence for the REQ, it appears that prediction of physiological arousal is a 
very stringent test to pass, given the apparent sensitivity and perhaps even instability of 
physiological arousal.  Thus, perhaps the REQ’s failure to predict physiological arousal is 
more a function of the nature of the physiological measurements than the ability of the 
REQ to effectively assess emotional evaluation. 
 97
Summary of Study Findings 
 While the REQ subscales were not significant predictors of emotional arousal or 
of cognitive priming, there is evidence in the current study that the REQ is a valid and 
reliable measure of emotional evaluation.  First, the previously unpublished results along 
with the results from the current data collection suggest the REQ has good convergent 
and discriminant validity, as well as good test-retest reliability and internal consistency.  
In addition, the secondary hypotheses support the proposed model between attachment 
style, emotion inhibition, and emotional evaluation, furthering the construct validation of 
the REQ by suggesting it is in fact measuring judgment of core emotions.  Lastly, the 
lack of significant prediction of emotional arousal or cognitive priming by the REQ 
might be a result of factors not related to the REQ’s predictive ability, such as extraneous 
influences during the study session affecting participants’ emotional and cognitive 
processing or the fact that physiological measurements appear to be extremely sensitive 
measures.   
 In sum, the results of the study strengthen the assertion that the REQ is a useful 
instrument in the assessment of naturally occurring emotional evaluation style.  The 
findings of the present study along with the results of previous data collections yield 
validity and reliability information that can increase the confidence of clinicians and 
researchers that the REQ is an adequate and useful measure of individuals’ tendency to 




Applications of the REQ 
 The REQ has potential use in both empirical and clinical arenas.  The REQ can be 
of use in research that involves judgment of emotions, such as the investigations of meta-
cognitions and secondary emotions (Lynch, Robins, Mores, and Krause, 2001; 
Papageorgiou and Wells, 1999, 2001; Wells and Carter, 1999, 2001).  Many researchers 
have investigated the cognitive or emotional reactions to anxiety and depression, but the 
REQ can be used in the investigation of emotional judgment of other core emotions, such 
as fear or embarrassment.  In addition, the REQ has utility in clinical settings in which 
emotional evaluation is of interest.  Wells and Carter (1999) and Nassif (1999) found that 
a negative evaluation of worry was a strong predictor of pathological worry and 
generalized anxiety disorder.  Assessing emotional evaluation with the REQ might help 
clinicians identify those individuals prone to a negative emotional evaluation in an 
attempt to prevent the development of mood-related disorders.  Also, in treatment 
programs that promote an open awareness to one’s emotions, such as Kabat-Zinn’s stress 
reduction and relaxation program (Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth, & Burney, 1985), Linehan’s 
dialectical behavior therapy (Linehan, 1987), and Hayes’ acceptance and commitment 
therapy (Hayes, 2004), the REQ can be used as a baseline measure of emotional 
evaluation as well as an indicator of treatment progression. 
Strengths 
 An important asset of the current study is that it assessed physiological arousal 
and cognitive priming objectively and not solely by subjective self-report.  Since these 
two constructs were key dependent variables in the study, it was beneficial to gather 
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information regarding arousal and cognitive priming in a relatively direct fashion.  The 
physiological measurements and the word recognition task were objective assessments, 
which decreased the likelihood of biases or demand characteristics influencing the results 
of emotional and cognitive arousal. 
 Another strength of the study is the utilization of a simulated “real-life” situation 
to induce a negative mood.  The negative mood induction in the study suggested to 
participants that their natural problem-solving ability was below average, which could be 
very personal and potentially upsetting feedback to receive.  Theoretically the emotions 
evoked by this negative feedback would be similar to those evoked by situations students 
might actually encounter, such as scoring below the class average on a test.  While the 
negative mood induction took place in an unnatural setting which could have decreased 
the salience of the failure feedback, the RAT presumably elicited emotions similar to 
what participants might experience after receiving negative feedback in their everyday 
lives, which is preferred over less invasive, more detached mood inductions such as 
viewing a sad movie clip.  Relatedly, the mood induction is standardized so that it 
minimizes idiosyncratic differences that would be brought in were subjects to use a 
personal recounting of a distressing experience as the mood manipulation. 
 In addition, a strength of the study is its analysis of REQ subscales both in a 
categorical and continuous manner.  For theoretical reasons, UES and PES scores were 
analyzed as continuous variables to retain the richness of the data and to not lose 
statistical power by creating subgroups.  For logistical reasons, UES and PES were 
analyzed as categorical variables though the creation of subgroups to allow for ease of 
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analysis and to facilitate a graphic depiction of participants’ emotional and cognitive 
arousal.  There are benefits to both a continuous and a categorical approach to the 
analyses, and the fact that both were included in the study strengthens the conclusions of 
the study by precluding the question of whether one statistical approach would have 
yielded results not found by the other approach.    
Limitations 
 An important limitation of the current study is that the participants possess certain 
characteristics that decrease the generalizability of the results to the larger population.  
The mean age of all participants was 21.5 with a standard deviation of 1.99.  Young 
adults attending a university often differ from other age groups on a number of 
dimensions, such as socio-economic status and level of education.  An important 
distinction for the purposes of the current study, however, is how college-age adults 
differ from other individuals in terms of emotional evaluation style.  Theoretically, 
acceptance of emotions would vary across the life-span, as individuals might become 
more or less judgmental of certain emotions as life circumstances and experiences 
change.  Also, acceptance of emotions might vary across generations.  For example, a 25-
year-old man might be more accepting of his depressive feelings than his 85-year-old 
grandfather, as society is currently more accepting of depression in men than it had been 
throughout the grandfather’s lifespan.  Therefore, exploring emotional evaluation in a 
young subset of the population may not be representative of the population as a whole.   
 Another limitation is that many of the constructs in the study were assessed by 
self-report questionnaires either in paper-and-pencil format or by online administration.  
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These measures are subject to biases and demand characteristics associated with such 
methods. 
 A third limitation is the ability of the probe questions asked at the end of the 
sessions to adequately ascertain the participants’ beliefs regarding the deceptive aspects 
of the study.  Those participants whose responses to probe questions suggested they 
deduced the true nature behind the RAT and RAT feedback were excluded from the 
study.  However, it is possible that the probe questions did not adequately assess 
understanding of the study methods by all participants.  Different probe questions might 
have led to more participants being excluded from the study if the current wording of the 
questions was unclear or misleading to some individuals.  While excluding more 
participants might have necessitated a larger number of total participants to yield the 
desired N for the statistical analyses, more significant results might have occurred if only 
data from those participants who truly were blind to the true nature of the methods were 
included in the analyses. 
 A fourth limitation is that the RAT may not have been an appropriate mood 
induction for an analysis of emotional evaluation.  As described earlier, the RAT appears 
to have led to increased arousal and negative affect but that does not necessarily indicate 
the presence of an emotion that individuals tend to judge.  While it is possible that the 
RAT induced a sense of failure it is also possible that the increased arousal and negative 
affect was a result of frustration, annoyance, or some other emotion that individuals may 
not be as likely to evaluate or second-guess. 
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 A fifth limitation is the fact that the participants were participating because of a 
class requirement and often appeared irritated and displeased about the required 
participation.  Potentially, participants’ thoughts and emotions during the study were 
largely influence by their preconceived notions about the study session.  As described 
previously, two important aspects of the study were emotional and cognitive processing 
about the mood induction, and therefore any external influences on the participants’ 
emotional and cognitive state could have confounded the study results.   
 There are also limitations regarding the development of the word recognition task.  
Specifically, the process of categorizing words as either RAT-related or neutral as well as 
the process of determining the difficulty of each word could have been more formalized.  
The lists of RAT-related and neutral words were developed by the investigator creating a 
list of words she considered to be neutral and a list of words thought to be RAT-related 
with fellow researchers providing feedback.  Word difficulty was determined by asking 
pilot subjects to rate the difficulty of two versions of each word, with each version 
consisting of a different combination of letters being replaced by asterisks.  The version 
of each word that received the more moderate ratings, indicating it was neither too easy 
nor too difficult, was included in the final word list.  Perhaps a more stringent piloting 
process to determine word categorization and word difficulty would have been beneficial.  
For example, pilot participants could have completed the RAT and then rated the words 
on the two lists as either RAT-related or neutral as well as the difficulty of the two 
versions of each word.  In addition, including enough pilot participants to warrant 
statistical analyses of the ratings might have been beneficial, as in the current study the 
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word categorization and difficulty were determined by viewing data by hand and human 
error and bias could have influenced the inclusion of words on the word recognition task. 
Areas for Future Research 
 As emotional evaluation is a relatively new topic in the literature, there are a 
number of exciting areas for future research.  One area is the intersection of ethnicity, 
race, and culture with emotional evaluation.  Presumably, individuals from different 
ethnicities and cultural backgrounds would differ in their emotional evaluation styles, as 
different cultures place value on various aspects of human behavior.  For example, an 
individual from a collectivistic culture might feel negatively about him or herself when 
experiencing pride in a personal achievement, while an individual from a more 
individualistic culture might feel very positively about him or herself when feeling pride 
in a similar achievement.  Future research on cultural differences in emotional evaluation 
with the REQ might include norming the REQ on various ethnic and cultural groups, as 
currently it has been administered primarily to individuals from the United States’ 
culture.  In addition, the REQ could be used to explore differences between groups in 
emotional evaluation.  While there were participants from various racial and ethnic 
backgrounds in the current study, there was not enough representation from groups other 
than White/Caucasian to perform statistical analyses between groups.  Administering the 
REQ to a sample with high representation from various racial and ethnic groups would be 
beneficial to analyze cultural differences in emotional evaluation.   
  Revising the current study to address the methodological concerns described 
above has great potential for exploring emotional evaluation by addressing the REQ’s 
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predictive validity in a more salient manner.  For instance, including volunteer 
participants and experimenting with the length of time between the mood induction and 
the termination of the physiological measurements and self-report mood might yield 
more compelling prediction results.  Past research has shown that participants remain 
aroused up to twelve hours after a negative mood induction (Watkins, 2004).  While 
measuring individuals’ arousal over a two-day period would have been interesting and 
compelling research, logistical and ethical concerns precluded that from being a viable 
option for the current study.  However, Watkins’ findings suggest that increasing the 
length of time over which participants’ arousal is monitored might yield more significant 
results and exploring this option is recommended.  In addition, inducing moods other 
than failure is recommended as well, as perhaps other emotions are more likely to be 
judged in an experimental setting.   
 Future investigations of the predictive validity of the REQ might involve a more 
naturalistic approach as opposed to the experimental procedure used in the current study.  
For instance, following Wells’ and Carter’s (1999) and Nassif’s (1999) assertion that 
meta-worry is a predictor of problematic anxiety and GAD, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether low scores on the REQ (indicating a negative emotional evaluation) 
could predict the development of difficulties related to mood.  For example, a study could 
ask college students to complete the REQ and questionnaires such as the Beck 
Depression Inventory and the Beck Anxiety Inventory at two or more points in time.  If 
low scores on the REQ predict an increase in anxiety or depression between time one and 
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time two, that result might indicate that the REQ is assessing reactions to emotions in a 
valid manner.   
 Another more naturalistic approach would be to look at individuals’ ability to 
cope with a stressful event.  Hayes (2004), Linehan (1987), and Kabat-Zinn (1994) all 
discuss an openness towards experiences and emotions as positive and beneficial, but 
perhaps the advantages of this open, non-judgmental stance are most observable after 
major stressors as opposed to relatively minor disappointments or failure experiences.  
One way to approach this idea empirically might be to ask individuals who recently 
experienced the death of a family member to complete the REQ along with measures of 
physical and emotional well-being at two or more points in time.  Presumably, high 
scores on the REQ (indicating high emotional acceptance) would predict scores on the 
outcome measures reflecting relatively positive well-being and effective coping.   
 Lastly, future research might include exploring the possibility of omitting the 
Pleasant Emotions Scale from the REQ.  The psychometric properties of the PES are 
weak, and while it correlates with related measures the results are not overly compelling.  
Replicating the previous administrations of the REQ including just the UES along with 
related measures would examine if the psychometric properties of the UES are stable 
when administered without the PES.  If the psychometric properties of the UES weaken 
when administered in isolation, the inclusion of the PES might be necessary for stable 
and valid responding on the UES.  If, however, the UES remains correlated with related 
measures and demonstrates adequate reliability and internal consistency when 




Reactions to Emotions Questionnaire 
 
1) People tend to feel sad when they have experienced loss or disappointment. Think of a 
recent situation in which you have felt SAD.  
 
Think about how you TYPICALLY FEEL ABOUT YOURSELF when you are sad. 
Don’t try to be logical about your ratings. Just go with your gut feeling. 
 
As you feel sad, you see yourself as: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
weak              strong 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
unlovable                     lovable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 





2) People often feel pride when receiving praise or positive attention from others. Think 
of a recent situation in which you have felt PRIDE.  
 
Think about how you TYPICALLY FEEL ABOUT YOURSELF when you feel pride. 
Don’t try to be logical about your ratings. Just go with your gut feeling. 
 
As you feel pride, you see yourself as: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
weak              strong 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
unlovable                     lovable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 




3) People often feel angry when they feel they have been treated unfairly or have been 
wronged in some way. Think of a recent situation in which you have felt ANGRY. 
 
Think about how you TYPICALLY FEEL ABOUT YOURSELF when you are angry. 
Don’t try to be logical about your ratings. Just go with your gut feeling. 
 
As you feel angry, you see yourself as: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
weak              strong 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
unlovable                     lovable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 







4) People tend to feel embarrassed when they perceive that they have appeared foolish to 
others. Think of a recent situation in which you have felt EMBARRASSED.  
 
Think about how you TYPICALLY FEEL ABOUT YOURSELF when you are 
embarrassed. Don’t try to be logical about your ratings. Just go with your gut feeling. 
 
As you feel embarrassed, you see yourself as: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
weak              strong 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
unlovable                     lovable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 









5) People sometimes feel anxious/fearful even in situations that are not exactly dangerous 
(e.g. fear may focus on heights, spiders, speeches, meeting new people, or possible 
dangers such as accidents or disease). Think of a recent situation in which you felt 
anxious/fearful, even though you were not really in danger. 
 
Think about how you TYPICALLY FEEL ABOUT YOURSELF when you are anxious/ 
fearful.  Don’t try to be logical about your ratings. Just go with your gut feeling. 
 
As you feel anxious/fearful, you see yourself as  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
weak              strong 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
unlovable                     lovable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 






6) People often feel excited when anticipating or expecting something positive. Think of 
a recent situation in which you have felt EXCITED. 
 
Think about how you TYPICALLY FEEL ABOUT YOURSELF when you are excited. 
Don’t try to be logical about your ratings. Just go with your gut feeling. 
 
As you feel excited, you see yourself as: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
weak              strong 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
unlovable                     lovable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 












Proposed Model Between Attachment Style, Emotional Evaluation, and  
Emotional Inhibition 
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Factor loadings for the Reactions to Emotions Questionnaire 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Emotion    Factor 1   Factor 2 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Sad 
    Weak/Strong    .59    .11 
     Unlovable/Lovable   .56    .16 
     Confused/Clear-headed   .63    .03 
Proud 
    Weak/Strong                        -.04    .64 
     Unlovable/Lovable   .04    .57 
     Confused/Clear-headed   .09    .64 
Angry 
     Weak/Strong    .33    .23 
     Unlovable/Lovable   .54    .10 
     Confused/Clear-headed   .41    .14 
Embarrassed 
     Weak/Strong    .71    .00 
     Unlovable/Lovable   .70    .06 
     Confused/Clear-headed   .62              -.00 
Anxious 
     Weak/Strong    .64    .02 
     Unlovable/Lovable   .60    .17 
     Confused/Clear-headed   .61    .02 
Excited 
     Weak/Strong   .10    .66 
     Unlovable/Lovable  .13    .67 
     Confused/Clear-headed  .14    .55 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
















Correlation Table of the Unpleasant Emotion Scale, the Pleasant Emotion Scale, 
 
and Related Questionnaires from Two Administrations (N=202 and N=345, respectively) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       UES   PES 
                Sample 1    Sample         Sample 1    Sample 2 
 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale         .38          .29 
Self-Acceptance Scale    .47      .45   .28         .23 
Trait Meta-Mood Scale (clarity factor)  .43      .29   .27        .16 
Relationship Scales Questionnaire 
 Secure Attachment   .30      .39   .21              .25 
 Fearful Attachment              -.20     -.14               -.12             -.14 
 Dismissing Attachment   .15      .05   .18            -.00 
 Preoccupied Attachment             -.29           -.16   -.22             .00 
White Bear Suppression Inventory             -.38     -.35  -.15      -.07 
Ruminative Responses Scale              -.28     -.34  -.25             .03  
Stanton Emotional Approach Scale  
 Emotional Processing Factor  .10             .15     .05             .22  
 Emotional Expression Factor  .20      .09     .16             .20   
Big Five Inventory      
 Conscientiousness Scale              .16      .14   .20             .30 
 Openness Scale    .14             .12   .13             .24 
 Neuroticism Scale              -.51            -.36              -.17      -.17  
 Agreeableness Scale               .03      .04                 .13       .27  
 Extroversion Scale   .34      .19               .17             .32 
Beck Depression Inventory              -.34     -.26                -.32           -.15 
Inventory to Diagnose Depression – Lifetime    -.21               -.16 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

















Reliability Analysis for Online Questionnaires and Subscales 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Scale       Coefficient alpha 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Reactions to Emotions Questionnaire 
 unpleasant emotions scale    .80 
 pleasant emotions scale     .76 
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills 
 accept without judgment subscale   .91     
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale     .91 
Relationship Scales Questionnaire 
 secure attachment     .41 
 dismissing attachment     .41 
 preoccupied attachment     .41 
 fearful attachment     .75 
 avoidant factor      .75 
 anxious factor      .82 
Trait Meta-Mood Scale  
 clarity factor      .89     
Leahy Emotional Schema Scale 
 expression subscale     .31 
 guilt subscale      .80 
 rumination subscale     .51 
 control subscale     .82 
 acceptance subscale     .73 
 comprehensibility subscale    .82 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (trait version)   .91    
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire     
 suppression subscale     .73 
 reappraisal subscale     .87 
Ruminative Responses Scale †     .89 
______________________________________________________________________________  















Ruminative Responses Scale 
 
People think and do many different things when they FEEL DEPRESSED. 
 
Please read each of the items below and indicate whether you never, sometimes, often, or 
always think or do each one when you FEEL DOWN, SAD, OR DEPRESSED.  
 
Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should do. 
 
                   Never   Sometimes  Often    Always 
 
1. Think about how alone you feel       1           2       3           4 
 
2. Think "I won't be able to do my job/work  
     if I don’t snap out of this"        1           2       3           4 
 
3. Think about your feelings of fatigue  
     and achiness         1           2       3           4 
 
4. Think about how hard it is to concentrate       1           2       3           4 
 
5. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?”      1           2       3           4 
 
6. Think about how passive and unmotivated  
    you feel          1           2       3           4 
 
7. Analyze recent events to try to understand  
    why you are depressed        1           2       3           4 
 
8. Think about how you don't seem to feel  
     anything anymore         1           2       3           4 
 
9. Think "Why can't I get going"                     1           2       3           4 
 
10. Think "Why do I always react this way?"     1           2       3           4 
 
11. Go away by yourself and think about  
       why you feel this way         1           2       3           4 
 
12. Write down what you are thinking  
       and analyze it         1           2       3           4 
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Never    Sometimes  Often    Always 
13. Think about a recent situation wishing  
      it had gone better          1           2       3           4 
     
14. Think “I won’t be able to concentrate  
       if I keep feeling this way”       1           2       3           4 
       
15. Think “Why do I have problems other  
      people don’t have?”        1           2       3           4 
 
16. Think “Why can’t I handle things better?”    1           2       3           4 
 
17. Think about how sad you feel                   1           2       3           4 
 
18. Think about all your shortcomings,  
      failings, faults, and mistakes        1           2       3           4 
 
19. Think about how you don't feel up to  
      doing anything         1           2       3           4 
 
20. Analyze your personality to try to  
      understand why you are depressed      1           2       3           4 
 
21. Go someplace alone to think about your  
      feelings          1           2       3           4 
 
22. Think about how angry you are with 




















Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
 
People have different ways of experiencing and handling emotions.  Using the following 
7-point scale, please answer the following questions about yourself by indicating the 
extent of your agreement.   
 
1)  When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what 
I’m thinking about.   
 
Strongly                       Strongly 
disagree               Neutral               agree 
     1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7 
 
2)  I keep my emotions to myself.  
 
Strongly                       Strongly 
disagree               Neutral               agree 
     1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7 
 
3)  When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what 
I’m thinking about.   
 
Strongly                       Strongly 
disagree               Neutral               agree 
     1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7 
 
4)  When I’m feeling positive emotions, I’m careful not to express them. 
 
Strongly                       Strongly 
disagree               Neutral               agree 
     1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7 
 
5)  When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that 
helps me stay calm.   
 
Strongly                       Strongly 
disagree               Neutral               agree 






6)  I control my emotions by not expressing them. 
 
Strongly                       Strongly 
disagree               Neutral               agree 
     1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7 
 
7)  When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation. 
 
Strongly                       Strongly 
disagree               Neutral               agree 
     1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7 
  
8)  I control my emotions by changing the way I’m thinking about the situation I’m in. 
 
Strongly                       Strongly 
disagree               Neutral               agree 
     1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7 
 
9)  When I’m feeling negative emotions, I’m careful not to express them. 
 
Strongly                       Strongly 
disagree               Neutral               agree 
     1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7 
 
10)  When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation.  
 
Strongly                       Strongly 
disagree               Neutral               agree 

















Relationship Scales Questionnaire 
 
Please read each of the following statements and rate the extent to which you believe 
each statement best describes your feelings about close relationships.  
 
             Not at all       Somewhat        Very much  
              like me        like me          like me  
 
1. I find it difficult to depend on other people.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. It is very important to me to feel independent.  1 2 3 4 5 
  
3. I find it easy to get emotionally close to others.  1 2 3 4 5 
  
4. I want to merge completely with another person.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. I worry that I will be hurt if I allow myself to  
    become too close to others.    1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. I am comfortable without close emotional  
    relationships.      1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. I am not sure that I can always depend on  
    others to be there when I need them.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. I want to be completely emotionally intimate  
    with others.      1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. I worry about being alone.     1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. I am comfortable depending on other people.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. I often worry that romantic partners don't  
      really love me.      1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. I find it difficult to trust others completely.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. I worry about others getting too close to me.  1 2 3 4 5 
 




   Not at all         Somewhat          Very much  
           like me      like me          like me  
15. I am comfortable having other people  
     depend on me.      1 2 3 4 5 
                 
16. I worry that others don't value me as much  
      as I value them.      1 2 3 4 5 
 
17. People are never there when you need them.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
18. My desire to merge completely sometimes  
      scares people away.     1 2 3 4 5 
  
19. It is very important to me to feel self-sufficient. 1 2 3 4 5  
   
20. I am nervous when anyone gets too close to me.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
21. I often worry that romantic partners won't  
      want to stay with me.     1 2 3 4 5 
 
22. I prefer not to have other people depend on me.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
23. I worry about being abandoned.    1 2 3 4 5 
 
24. I am somewhat uncomfortable being close  
      to others.       1 2 3 4 5 
 
25. I find that others are reluctant to get as close  
      as I would like.      1 2 3 4 5 
 
26. I prefer not to depend on others.    1 2 3 4 5 
 
27. I know that others will be there when I  
      need them.      1 2 3 4 5 
 
28. I worry about having others not accept me.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
29. Romantic partners often want me to be closer  
      than I feel comfortable being.    1 2 3 4 5 
 









On this questionnaire are groups of statements.  Please read each group of statements carefully.  
Then pick out the one statement in each group which best describes the way you have been 
feeling the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY!  Circle the number beside the statement you 
picked.  If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle each one.  Be sure to 
read all the statements in each group before making your choice. 
 
1.  0 I do not feel sad. 
    1 I feel sad. 
    2 I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it. 
    3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
 
2.  0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
    1 I feel discouraged about the future. 
    2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
    3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things  
     cannot improve. 
 
3.  0 I do not feel like a failure. 
    1 I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
    2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
    3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
 
4.  0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
    1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
    2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
    3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
 
5.  0 I don't feel particularly guilty. 
    1 I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
    2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
    3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
 
6.  0 I don't feel I am being punished. 
    1 I feel I may be punished. 
    2 I expect to be punished. 
    3 I feel I am being punished. 
 
7.  0 I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
    1 I am disappointed in myself. 
    2 I am disgusted with myself. 





8.  0 I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
    1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
    2 I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
    3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
 
9. 0 I don't cry anymore than usual. 
    1 I cry more now than I used to. 
    2 I cry all the time now. 
    3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can't even though I want to. 
 
10. 0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am. 
     1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to. 
     2 I feel irritated all the time now. 
     3 I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me. 
 
11. 0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
     1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
     2 I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
     3 I have lost all of my interest in other people. 
 
12. 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
     1 I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
     2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 
     3 I can't make decisions at all anymore. 
 
13. 0 I don't feel I look any worse than I used to. 
    1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
    2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make  
      me look unattractive. 
    3 I believe that I look ugly. 
 
14. 0 I can work about as well as usual. 
    1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
    2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
    3 I can't do any work at all. 
 
15. 0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
    1 I don't sleep as well as I used to. 
    2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
    3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep. 
 
16. 0 I don't get more tired than usual. 
    1 I get tired more easily than I used to. 
    2 I get tired from doing almost anything. 





17. 0 My appetite is no worse than usual. 
    1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
    2 My appetite is much worse now. 
    3 I have no appetite at all anymore. 
 
18. 0 I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately. 
    1 I have lost more than 5 pounds.  If purposely trying to lose 
    2 I have lost more than 10 pounds.  weight by eating less,  
    3 I have lost more than 15 pounds.  check here ___. 
 
19. 0 I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
     1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset  
      stomach; or constipation. 
     2 I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of much else. 
     3 I am so worried about my physical problems, that I cannot think about anything  
      else. 
 
20. 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
     1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
     2 I am much less interested in sex now. 































Trait Anxiety Inventory 
 
DIRECTIONS:  A number of statements that people have used to describe themselves are given 
below.  Read each statement, and then circle the appropriate response to the right that indicates 
how you generally feel.   
There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any one statement, but 






























1.  I feel pleasant.  1 2 3 4 
2.  I tire quickly. 1 2 3 4 
3.  I feel like crying. 1 2 3 4 
4.  I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be. 1 2 3 4 
5.  I am losing out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon 
enough. 
1 2 3 4 
     
6.  I feel rested. 1 2 3 4 
7.  I am “calm, cool, and collected.” 1 2 3 4 
8.  I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them. 1 2 3 4 
9.  I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter. 1 2 3 4 
10.  I am happy. 1 2 3 4 
     
11.  I am inclined to take things hard. 1 2 3 4 
12.  I lack self-confidence. 1 2 3 4 
13.  I feel secure. 1 2 3 4 
14.  I try to avoid facing a crisis or difficulty. 1 2 3 4 
15.  I feel blue. 1 2 3 4 
     
16.  I am content. 1 2 3 4 
17.  Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me. 1 2 3 4 
18.  I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my 
mind. 
1 2 3 4 
19.  I am a steady person. 1 2 3 4 
20.  I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns 
and interests. 







Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
This scale consists of a number of different words that describe different feelings and emotions.  
Read each item and then circle the appropriate number next to the word.  Indicate to what extent 
you feel this way at the present moment.   
 
      very slightly/          a little          moderately      quite a bit       extremely 
      not at all 
interested   1  2  3          4             5 
distressed   1  2  3          4             5 
excited    1  2  3          4             5 
upset    1  2  3          4             5 
strong    1  2  3          4             5 
guilty    1  2  3          4             5 
scared    1  2  3          4             5 
hostile    1  2  3          4             5 
enthusiastic   1  2  3          4             5 
proud    1  2  3          4             5 
irritable    1  2  3          4             5 
alert    1  2  3          4             5 
ashamed   1  2  3          4             5 
inspired   1  2  3          4             5 
nervous    1  2  3          4             5 
determined   1  2  3          4             5 
attentive   1  2  3          4             5 
jittery    1  2  3          4             5 
active    1  2  3          4             5 
afraid    1  2  3          4             5 
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Appendix L 
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills – Accept Without Judgment Scale 
Please read the following items and circle the number that best reflects how true each 
statement is for you. 
 
             Never or very Seldom   Sometimes   Often  Almost always 
                rarely true     true         true  true      or always true   
     
1. I criticize myself for having 
    irrational or inappropriate 
    emotions.            1       2           3    4          5  
 
2. I tend to evaluate whether my 
    perceptions are right or wrong.   1       2           3    4          5  
 
3. I tell myself that I shouldn’t be 
    feeling the way I’m feeling.        1       2           3    4          5  
 
4. I believe some of my thoughts 
    are abnormal or bad and I  
    shouldn’t think that way.             1       2           3    4          5  
 
5. I make judgments about whether 
    my thoughts are good or bad.      1       2           3    4          5  
 
6. I tend to make judgments about  
    how worthwhile or worthless 
    my experiences are.                     1       2           3    4          5  
 
7. I tell myself that I shouldn’t be 
    thinking the way I’m thinking.    1       2           3    4          5  
 
8. I think some of my emotions are  
    bad or inappropriate and I  
    shouldn’t be feeling them.           1       2           3    4          5  
 
9. I disapprove of myself when I 





Emotional Schema Scale 
 
We are interested in how you deal with your feelings or emotions – for example, how you 
deal with feelings of anger, sadness, anxiety, or sexual feelings.  We all differ in how we 
deal with these feelings, so there are no right or wrong answers.  Please read each 
sentence carefully and answer each sentence, using the scale below, as to how you deal 
with your feelings during the past month.  Put the number of your response next to the 
sentence.   
 
Scale:  1 = very untrue of me 
 2 = somewhat untrue of me 
 3 = slightly untrue of me 
 4 = slightly true of me 
 5 = somewhat true of me 
 6 = very true of me 
 
1. ___  Some feelings are wrong to have. 
2. ___  When I feel down, I sit by myself and think a lot about how bad I feel. 
3. ___  I worry that if I have certain feelings I might go crazy. 
4. ___  You can’t allow yourself to have certain kinds of feelings – like feelings                   
about sex or violence. 
5. ___  I think that there are feelings that I have that I am not really aware of. 
6. ___  My feelings seem to come out of nowhere. 
7. ___  When I have a feeling that bothers me I try to think of something else to 
think about or do. 
8. ___  If I let myself have some of these feelings, I fear that I will lose control. 
9. ___  There are things about myself that I just don’t understand. 
10. ___  I often say to myself, “What’s wrong with me?” 
11. ___  I feel ashamed about my feelings. 
12. ___  I want people to believe that I am different from the way I truly feel. 
13. ___  I focus a lot on my feelings or my physical sensations. 
14. ___  I feel that I can express my feelings openly.   
15. ___  My feelings don’t make sense to me. 
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Scale:  1 = very untrue of me 
      2 = somewhat untrue of me 
      3 = slightly untrue of me 
      4 = slightly true of me 
      5 = somewhat true of me 
      6 = very true of me 
 
16. ___  I try to get rid of an unpleasant feeling immediately. 
17. ___  You have to guard against having certain feelings. 
 
18. ___  When I feel down, I try to think about a different way to view things. 
19. ___  I worry that I won’t be able to control my feelings. 
20. ___  I think that my feelings are strange or weird. 
21. ___  I accept my feelings. 
22. ___  I believe that it is important to let myself cry in order to get my feelings 
“out.” 
23. ___  I don’t want to admit to having certain feelings – but I know that I have 
them. 
24. ___  I shouldn’t have some of the feelings that I have. 





















Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
 
For the following statements, please circle the number which indicates how much you 
agree or disagree with the statement. 
 
1.  I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others. 
 
                 1                                   2                             3                                    4 
.......Strongly Agree...................Agree....................Disagree..............Strongly Disagree... 
 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
 
                 1                                   2                             3                                    4 
.......Strongly Agree...................Agree....................Disagree..............Strongly Disagree... 
 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure 
 
                 1                                   2                             3                                    4 
.......Strongly Agree...................Agree....................Disagree..............Strongly Disagree... 
 
4.  I am able to do things as well almost other people. 
 
                 1                                   2                             3                                    4 
.......Strongly Agree...................Agree....................Disagree..............Strongly Disagree... 
 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
 
                 1                                   2                             3                                    4 
.......Strongly Agree...................Agree....................Disagree..............Strongly Disagree... 
 
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
 
                 1                                   2                             3                                    4 
.......Strongly Agree...................Agree....................Disagree..............Strongly Disagree... 
 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
 
                 1                                   2                             3                                    4 







8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
 
                 1                                   2                             3                                    4 
.......Strongly Agree...................Agree....................Disagree..............Strongly Disagree... 
 
9. I certainly feel useless at times. 
 
                 1                                   2                             3                                    4 
.......Strongly Agree...................Agree....................Disagree..............Strongly Disagree... 
 
10.  At times I think I am no good at all. 
 
                 1                                   2                             3                                    4 
































Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) – Clarity Factor 
 
We are interested in finding out what people feel and think about their emotions in 
general.  Please read each statement and decide whether or not you agree with it.  Circle 
the number that best describes you for each item below. 
 
Strongly                Strongly      
Disagree                 Agree       
   
 
1     2     3     4       5       I am usually confused about how I feel.   
 
1     2     3     4       5        I am often aware of my feelings. 
 
1     2     3     4       5      I can never tell how I feel.   
 
1     2     3     4       5         My beliefs and opinions always seem to change 
     depending on how I feel. 
 
1     2     3     4       5         Sometimes I can't tell what my feelings are.  
 
1     2     3     4       5         I almost always know exactly how I feel.  
 
1     2     3     4       5         I feel at ease about my emotions. 
 
1     2     3     4       5         I am usually very clear about my feelings.  
 
1     2     3     4       5         I usually know my feelings about a matter 
 
1     2     3     4       5         I am rarely confused about how I feel. 
 



























At the time that you got the feedback regarding your performance on the problem  solving 





Have you ever been in any study that asked you to write, similar to this one?  If so, what 





Did anyone tell you anything about this study before you participated today?  If so, what 























Complete online battery of questionnaires 
 
Phase Two 
Upon arrival to study session, complete consent form and BDI 
  ↓ 
Complete PANAS (self-report measure of mood) 
  ↓ 
Hook-up to physiological monitor  
  ↓ 
8 minute sit (allow for stabilization of physiological measurements and gather baseline 
physiological data) 
  ↓ 
RAT and negative feedback (negative mood induction) 
  ↓ 
Powerpoint presentation 
  ↓ 
Complete PANAS  
  ↓ 
Writing phase – eight minutes (allow for emotional processing) 
  ↓ 
Sitting phase – three minutes (allow for emotional processing) 
  ↓ 
Complete PANAS 
  ↓ 
Writing phase – ten minutes (allow for emotional processing) 
  ↓ 
Sitting phase – three minutes (allow for emotional processing) 
  ↓ 
Complete PANAS 
  ↓ 
Word response task (measure of rumination about negative mood induction) 
  ↓ 
Unhook-up from physiological monitor and ask probed questions 
  ↓ 




Means and Standard Deviations of Questionnaires  
 
Assessing Ideas Related to Emotional Evaluation  








REQ-unpleasant emotions subscale 31.62 6.53 14 48 
REQ-pleasant emotions subscale 25.71 3.17 16 30 
TMMS-clarity factor 39.38 7.67 20 55 
RSQ-secure 16.06 3.09 7 23 
RSQ-fearful 10.97 3.49 4 20 
RSQ-preoccupied 11.59 2.76 5 20 
RSQ-dismissing 15.91 2.85 9 24 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 18.25 5.73 10 37 
KIMS-accept without judgment subscale 24.74 7.39 9 45 
LESS-expression subscale 8.17 2.35 2 12 
LESS-guilt subscale 11.10 4.63 4 24 
LESS-rumination subscale 17.27 4.25 7 30 
LESS-control subscale 13.06 3.79 3 18 
LESS-acceptance of feelings subscale 27.83 5.86 8 42 
LESS-comprehensibility subscale 16.69 4.46 4 24 
STAI-Trait version 41.21 9.88 23 73 
ERQ-suppression subscale 13.44 4.65 4 28 
ERQ-reappraisal subscale 27.34 6.62 6 42 














Correlation Table of the Unpleasant Emotion Scale, the Pleasant Emotion Scale,  
and Related Questionnaires  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       UES   PES 
                
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills 
 accept without judgment subscale  -.38**    .04 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale     .33**      .25**    
Trait Meta-Mood Scale  
 clarity factor      .37**    .23** 
Leahy Emotional Schema Scale 
 expression subscale     .15*    .09  
 guilt subscale     -.39**   -.07 
 rumination subscale    -.35**   -.04 
 control subscale     .34**    .14  
 acceptance subscale     .20**    .05 
 comprehensibility subscale    .39**    .13 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (trait version)  -.45**   -.16* 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
 suppression subscale    -.13   -.17* 
 reappraisal subscale     .08    .17* 
Ruminative Responses Scale †    -.46**   -.08 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 



















Descriptive Data for Medians of Heart Rate (HR), Skin Conductance (SC),  
and Skin Temperature (ST) at Session Phases 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Baseline     
      HR 116.69 6.53 103.00 132.12 
      SC 4.74 2.66 1.31 15.95 
      ST 77.16 3.83 72.78 90.92 
RAT feedback     
      HR 117.61 16.36 88.33 156.29 
      SC 6.50 3.25 1.29 21.50 
      ST 77.85 3.81 73.52 91.12 
Writing 1     
      HR 116.02 6.41 96.93 129.03 
      SC 6.23 3.33 1.35 20.93 
      ST 77.76 3.53 73.72 90.99 
Sitting 1     
      HR 116.02 11.75 92.68 153.57 
      SC 6.17 3.34 1.48 20.99 
      ST 77.54 3.35 73.63 89.80 
Writing 2     
      HR 117.51 6.04 105.73 130.83 
      SC 6.00 3.30 1.66 21.08 
      ST 77.75 3.94 73.70 97.20 
Sitting 2     
      HR 118.26 11.63 89.82 143.62 
      SC 6.04 3.32 1.80 20.71 
      ST 77.84 3.94 73.93 92.17 











Intercorrelation Matrix between Median Heart Rate (HR), Median Skin Conductance (SC),  
and Median Skin Temperature (ST) at Six Study Phases 
 
 Baseline RAT feedback Writing 1 Sitting 1 Writing 2 Sitting 2 
 HR SC ST HR SC ST HR SC ST HR SC ST HR SC ST HR SC ST 
Baseline HR  1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Baseline SC  .33** 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Baseline ST  -.13 .05 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RAT feedback HR  .09 -.16 -.01 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RAT feedback  SC  .29* .89** .04 -.21 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RAT feedback ST  -.23 .01 .85** .16 -.01 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Writing 1 HR  -.12 .11 -.00 .02 .10 -.00 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Writing 1 SC  .30* .88** .04 -.21 .99** -.02 .13 1 - - - - - - - - - - 
Writing 1 ST  -.22 .06 .57** .18 .04 .70** .12 .03 1 - - - - - - - - - 
Sitting 1HR .00 .20 -.25* -.19 .13 -.16 -.12 .12 -.13 1 - - - - - - - - 
Sitting 1 SC .30* .88** .04 -.21 .99** -.02 .12 1.0** .02 .13 1 - - - - - - - 
Sitting 1 ST -.14 .00 .54** .18 -.01 .59** .08 -.01 .92** -.11 -.02 1 - - - - - - 
Writing 2 HR .01 -.19 .03 -.21 -.17 .05 .08 -.16 .01 -.07 -.17 .05 1 - - - - - 
Writing 2 SC .31** .88** .04 -.18 .99** -.03 .12 .99** -.00 .11 .99** -.04 -.17 1 - - - - 
Writing 2 ST -.16 -.02 .46** .01 -.03 .47** .11 -.03 .81** -.05 -.03 .90** .03 -.06 1 - - - 
Sitting 2 HR -.04 -.08 .11 .14* -.06 .15 -.17 -.05 .11 .18 -.04 .14 -.30* -.04 .17 1 - - 
Sitting 2 SC .31** .88** .03 -.19 .98** -.04 .12 .99** .00 .12 .99** -.04 -.18 1.0** -.05 -.03 1 - 
Sitting 2 ST -.19 -.06 .45** .14 -.03 .61** .08 -.02 .80** -.04 -.03 .85** -.01 -.05 .88** .27* -.04 1 




Reliability Analysis for PANAS subscales 
 
_________________________________________ 
Scale    Coefficient alpha 
_________________________________________ 
PA 1     .90 
NA 1     .87 
PA 2     .88 
NA 2     .89 
PA 3     .90 
NA 3     .87 
PA 4     .90 



































Descriptive Data for PANAS Subscales 
 
 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
PA 1 23.67 7.87 11.00 43.00 
NA 1 13.50 5.00 10.00 38.00 
PA 2 20.41 6.56 10.00 39.00 
NA 2 15.04 5.69 10.00 33.00 
PA 3 18.23 6.51 10.00 39.00 
NA 3 13.62 4.78 10.00 34.00 
PA 4 17.20 6.51 10.00 36.00 





























Intercorrelation Matrix between the Positive Affect Scales and the Negative Affect Scales  
from PANAS’s 1-4 
 PA 1 NA 1 PA 2 NA 2 PA 3 NA 3 PA 4 NA 4
PA 1 1 - - - - - - - 
NA 1 .13 1 - - - - - - 
PA 2 .83** .09 1 - - - - - 
NA 2 .20 .77** .17 1 - - - - 
PA 3 .79** .29* .90** .31* 1 - - - 
NA 3 .14 .84** .13 .76** .26* 1 - - 
PA 4 .71** .34** .81** .30* .93** .29* 1 - 
NA 4 .21 .81** .15 .74** .26* .90** .26* 1 





























Correlation Matrix between Median Heart Rate (HR), Median Skin Conductance (SC), 
and Median Skin Temperature (ST) with PANAS Subscales 
   
PANAS 1 PANAS 2 PANAS 3 PANAS 4 
 PA  NA PA NA PA NA PA NA 
Baseline         
      HR -.11 -.04 -.10 .07 -.17 -.00 -.17 .14 
      SC .01 .10 .05 .04 -.02 .17 .00 .13 
      ST .01 -.08 .05 .04 -.06 -.09 .02 -.10 
  RAT feedback         
      HR .09 -.14 .13 -.24* .11 -.14 .14 -.11 
      SC .03 .07 .08 .04 .01 .15 .02 .11 
      ST .05 -.14 -.01 -.18 -.08 -.18 .00 -.18 
Writing 1         
      HR .28* .07 .18 -.05 .30* .18 .25* .15 
      SC .06 .08 .09 .07 .01 .17 .02 .13 
      ST .09 -.09 .02 -.14 -.02 -.14 .06 -.18 
Sitting 1         
      HR -.04 .03 -.18 .02 -.15 -.07 -.13 -.06 
      SC .07 .08 .10 .07 .02 .16 .02 .12 
      ST .02 -.06 -.04 -.10 -.05 -.14 .08 -.21 
Writing 2         
      HR -.05 -.02 -.12 .03 -.22 .00 -.16 .00 
      SC .06 .06 .10 .05 .02 .17 .02 .13 
      ST -.00 -.06 -.12 -.06 -.13 -.12 -.04 -.18 
Sitting 2         
      HR -.07 .03 -.04 .09 .09 -.00 .03 .00 
      SC .06 .07 .09 .06 .01 .17 .03 .00 
      ST -.05 -.11 -.17 -.15 -.17 -.19 -.11 -.25* 











Correlations between the UES and PES with Physiological Variables and PANAS 
Subscales 
 UES PES 
Baseline   
      HR -.01 .01 
      SC .05 .09 
      ST .03 -.04 
  RAT feedback   
      HR .02 .04 
      SC .11 .11 
      ST -.02 .03 
Writing 1   
      HR .11 -.06 
      SC .10 .11 
      ST -.10 .11 
Sitting 1   
      HR -.04 .20 
      SC .11 .11 
      ST -.16 .11 
Writing 2   
      HR -.10 -.13 
      SC .09 .10 
      ST -.17 .03 
Sitting 2   
      HR -.10 .22 
      SC .09 .10 
      ST -.11 .07 
PA 1 .12 .08 
NA 1 -.14 .13 
PA 2 .09 .00 
NA 2 -.27* .14 
PA 3 .11 .01 
NA 3 -.14 .14 
PA 4 .08 -.01 
NA 4 -.17 .17 






















Mean Heart Rate Across Session Phases for PES Groups 
Baseline RAT 
feedback








































Mean Heart Rate Across Session Phases for UES Groups 




























































































Mean Skin Temperature Across Session Phases for UES Groups 












































Mean Skin Conductance Across Study Sessions for PES 
 
Groups 
Baseline RAT  
feedback










































Mean Skin Conductance Across Session Phases for UES Groups 















































Positive Affect (PA) Scores Across Four Administrations  
 
of the PANAS for PES Groups 




































Mean Positive Affect (PA) Scores Across Four PANAS Administrations 
 
for UES Groups 













































































 Mean Negative Affect (NA) Scores Across Four PANAS Administrations  
 
for UES Groups 






















* indicates a RAT-related stimulus word 
** indicates an incorrect response included as RAT-related 
 
Association*   Incapable*   Healing 
Occasion   Inaptable   Help 
Associate**   Inappropriate   Helen 
Creature   Inoperable   Helmet 
    Inapplicable   Helpful 
Automobile   Enable 
Assemble   Inaffable   Word* 
Tangle    Inedible   Weird 
Amicable   Inaudible   Wired 
Attempt   Inability**   Weed 
Amiable       Ward 
    Unsatisfied*   
Regulate   Justified   Bright 
Ructile    Unfrustrated**  Blight 
Ringlet   Unstuffed   Inhibit 
Roulette       Bitch 
Regret    Sterile 
Regalite   Senile    Clean 
Regular   Sensible   Cent 
Relegate   Serenity   Calm 
        Cream 
Disappoint*   Upset*   Crind 
Disappointment**  Uptight   Seven 
Disposition 
Disappointed**  Digital    Worse* 
Diaspora   Denial    Wool 
Disappropriate  Dialect    Worry** 
Dilapatory   Distal    Wolf 
Deploy   Difficult**   Were 
Diplomat   Dismal    World 
        Whoa 
Agreeable   Ability*   Word** 
Agree    Arbitrary   Woes 
Aggravate**       Wrote 
    Sweet    Worst** 
Frustrated*   Sweat    Work 




Radio    Independent   Confusing* 
Ready    Identify   Confusion** 
Redial     Ingredient   Confuse** 
Rigid    Identical   Confession 
Rodeo    Identity   Confidence 
Riddle    Indecadent   Confined 
Radius    Different 
    Indetermine   Invisible 
Weakness*   Identification   Invincible 
Weakless   Incidence   Inevitable 
    Indifferent   Irreversible 
Mistake*   Indefinite   Inversitile 
State    Indentured   Inirascible 
Musket   Identification 
    Indecent   Error* 
Defeat*       Zero** 
Define    Tasty    Hero 
Defrost   Tipsy    Erosion 
Defy    Testy** 
Default   Tasky 
Defense   Toasty 
Decaf    Tissy 
Different   Tossy 
Deflate   Tizzy 
Difficult** 
Defile    Terrible* 
    Trouble 
Coffee 
Careful   Musical 
Café    Mistrial 
Caffeine   Miserable** 
    Mistletoe 
Negative*   Missile 
Nighttime   Mystical 
    Mistake** 
Poor*    Mystery 
Prior 
    Unsuccessful* 












Deviation Minimum Maximum 
RAT-related Words     
         median response time 792.92 201.14 470.05 1631.00 
         number correct 14.77 2.30 8.00 19.00 
Control Words     
         median response time 873.62 273.35 541 2081 
         number correct 9.54 2.53 4.00 16.00 





























































































































   Mean Response Time to RAT-Related and Neutral Words  
 











































Variable                  Coeff.             rs      rs2  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Emotional Evaluation 
Reactions to Emotions Questionnaire 
 UES     -.64           -.73  53.1%  
 PES       .01           -.12    1.4% 
Emotional Inhibition 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
 Suppression Subscale     .69            .77  59.6% 
 
Rs2           33.7% 
 
Attachment 
Relationship Scales Questionnaire 
 Secure     -.82          -.96  92.0% 
 Dismissing      .14           .39  15.5% 
 Preoccupied                  -.07           .31    9.6% 
 Fearful       .25           .74  54.2%  
  
Note: 
Coeff. = standardized canonical function coefficients 
rs = structure coefficient 
rs2 = squared structure coefficient or variance explained 












Intercorrelation Matrix between Attachment Styles from the RSQ, PES and UES from the 
REQ, and Suppression Subscale from the ERQ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Secure     Fearful        Preocc.      Dismiss.         UES         PES       Suppr. 
Secure       1         -                    -                 -                  -               -              - 
 Fearful -.57**         1             -                 -                  -               -             - 
Preoccupied -.40**     -.37**                1                  -                  -              -             - 
Dismissing      -.18**       .32**           -.25**                1                -              -             - 
UES                  .42**     -.35**            -.26**            -.04               1               -             - 
PES              .06          -.00                .14                 -.01              .01             1            - 
Suppression     -.41**      .30**             .01                  .30**         -.13         -.17*           1   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
























Proposed Model Between Attachment Style, Emotional Evaluation, and  
Emotional Inhibition with First-Order Correlations Included 
 
 
View of Other  
     (reflected in emotional inhibition vs. expression) 
 
Positive         Negative 
 
   
                  
 
 
                               
Positive  
View of Self 
(reflected in  
emotional 
evaluation) 
                                  















Do not inhibit emotions 
r2 = -.41** 
 
Positive emotional evaluation 




Do inhibit emotions 
r2 = .30** 
 
Positive emotional evaluation 




Do no inhibit emotions 
r2 = .01 
 
Negative emotional evaluation




Do inhibit emotions 
r2 = .30** 
 
Negative emotional evaluation
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